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Most contemporary risk assessment techniques, such as failure modes and effect analysis 
(FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), and probabilistic r sk analysis (PRA) rely on a chain-
of-event paradigm of accident causation. Event-based techniques have some limitations 
for the study of modern engineering systems; specifically hydropower dams. They are not 
suited to handle complex computer-intensive systems, complex human-machine 
interactions, and systems-of-systems with distributed decision-making that cut across 
both physical and organizational boundaries. The emrging paradigm today, however, is 
not to analyze dam systems separately by breaking the major disciplines into stand-alone 
vertical analyses; but to explore the possibilities inherent in taking a systems approach to 
modeling the reliability of flow-control functions within the entire system.  
This dissertation reports on the development and application of systems reliability models 
to operational aspects of a hydropower cascade in Northern Ontario: The Lower 
Mattagami River (LMR) Project operated by Ontario Pwer Generation (OPG). The 
reliability of flow-control systems is a broad topic that covers structural, mechanical, 




organization issues, policies and procedures. All of these occur in a broad spectrum of 
environmental conditions. A systems simulation approach is presented for grappling with 
these varied influences on flow-control systems in hydropower installations. 
The Mattagami River cascade operated by Ontario Power Generation is a series of four 
power stations along the Mattagami River and the Adams Creek bypass channel from 
Little Long GS at the top to the cascade to the Mattag mi River below Kipling GS at the 
bottom. The number of riparians in the river flood plain is few and there is no 
commercial riverine navigation, so potential loss of life is small or negligible and 
operational safety dominates. The problem facing the project was to conceptualize a 
systems engineering model for the operation of the dams, spillways, and other 
components; then to employ the model through stochastic simulation to investigate 
protocols for the safe operation of the spillway and flow control system. Details of the 






















Adiel Nii-Ayi Komey 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fufillment 
Of the requirements for the degree of 









Dr. Gregory Baecher, Chair 
Dr. Lewis Ed Link 















© Copyright by 






First and foremost, the most heartfelt thanks go to my family (Mom, Dad, Cyril and 
Rhoda) for their unconditional love and support. I would also like to thank Dr. Baecher, 
my academic advisor, thesis supervisor, and friend. Your guidance, support and 
enthusiasm throughout all LMR complex project at the University of Maryland made this 
work possible. And last but not least, I would also like to thank my committee members 
for their guidance, as well as all the members of the SSRP who generated many of the 
insight upon which this research is based. Thank you to all the people at Ontario Power 




















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION:  ON THE SYSTEMS RLIABILITY MODELING APPROACH TO RISK 
ANALYSIS IN DAM SAFTY 1 
CHAPTER 1: RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN DAM SAFETY-LITERATURE REVIEW 4 
1.1 Understanding How Dams Fail 4 
1.2   Other Factors Influencing Potential Failure in Dams 6 
1.1.1   Definition of Hazard 6 
1.1.2   Potential Failure Modes 9 
1.1.3 Dam Life Phases 10 
1.1.4 Other Factors Influencing Potential Failure in Dams 12 
1.2   DAM SYSTEMS 14 
1.3   CURRENT STATE OF THE PRACTICE 15 
1.3.1   Standards-Based Decision-Making 16 
1.3.2   Risk-informed decision making 17 
1.3.3   Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) 19 
1.4   ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 21 
1.4.1 Normal Accident Theory 22 
1.4.2 High Reliability Organizations 24 
1.5 Systems Engineering 26 
1.5.1 DAMS AS ENGINEERED SYSTEMS 26 
1.6 THESIS SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES 29 
1.6.1 THESIS OBJECTIVE 30 
1.6.2 THESIS OUTLINE 32 
CHapter 2: systems engineering application to Spillway systems 33 
2.1   System Boundaries: The Context Diagram 33 
2.2   STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 34 
2.3   CONTEXT DIAGRAM: SPILLWAY SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 35 
2.4   REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 37 
2.4.1 System Level Requirements For Proposed Analysis Framework 37 
2.4.2   Allocation And Flow-Down Process 39 
2.5   USE CASE DIAGRAMS 41 
2.5.1   SYSTEMS LEVEL USE CASE 42 
2.5.2   BUILD MODE USE CASE 43 
2.5.3   Run Model Use Case 44 
2.6 ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS 46 
iv 
2.6.3   Simulation Activity Diagram 47 
Chapter 3: Lower Mattagami River Basin Case Study 49 
3.1 BACKGROUND 49 
3.1.1 Location 49 
3.1.2 Generating Stations 51 
3.1.3 Station Characteristics 52 
3.2 Generating Stations 55 
3.2.1 Little Long GS 55 
3.2.2 Smoky Falls GS 56 
3.2.3 Harmon GS 58 
3.2.4 Kipling GS 60 
3.3 Lower Mattagami River (LMR) Complex SYSTEMS MODELING 62 
3.3.1   Current State of Events at Lower Mattagami 63 
3.3.2   Existing Generating Stations 65 
3.4.1   Core Objectives of the LoweR Mattagami River Case Study 66 
3.4.2   Features 67 
3.5   Viewpoints 67 
3.6   Major Risks Identified Risks 68 
3.7 SYSTEMS and Study Boundaries 68 
3.8 GoldSim™ Modeling Framework 71 
3.8.1 Background to GoldSim™ and the Reliability Module 71 
3.8.2 THE Reliability Module 72 
3.9   Why GoldSim™? 72 
4.   Hydrologic Modeling and Flow Routing 74 
4.1 Historic Time Series Data 76 
4.2 The Modeled System Schematic 78 
3.3 Operating Patterns and flow routing 79 
4.4 Flow Routing at Little Long 81 
4.4.1 Operation (Little Long) 82 
4.5   Flow Routing at Smokey Falls 84 
4.5.1   Operation (Smokey) 85 
3.6   Harmon Operations 85 
4.7   Kipling Operations 87 
4.8 Reservoir Operations Summary 87 




4.9 Power Generation 88 
5.0   The Model 90 
5.1 Reservoir Modeling 91 
5.2 Power Generation Modeling 93 
5.3 Spillway Gates and Turbine Operations 94 
5.4 Modeling Local inflow at Kipling 98 
5.5 Simulation Run Settings 100 
5.6 Model Run Settings 101 
5.7 Flow Routing Sample Results and Analysis 101 
5.7.1   Pool and Volume Capacities 106 
5.8 Power Production 108 
6.   Spillway Analysis Modeling and Reliability analysis 113 
6.1 Vertical Lift Gates 113 
5.3 Load Types on Gates 115 
6.4 Rate of Flow and Conveyance 116 
6.5 Spillway Gate Operations: Flow Routing at LMR 117 
6.6 Failure 118 
6.7 Failure Mechanisms 119 
6.8 Failure Mode of Gates 120 
6.9 Reliability and peformance of gated Spillways 122 
6.9.1 Flow Routing Capacities 122 
6.9.2 Modeling function and failure 122 
6.10 Little Long GS Spillway Gates Modeling 124 
6.11 Communication and Human Operator Modeling 124 
6.13 Reservoir Operations 126 
6.14 Accounting for Performance Uncertainty 127 
6.14.1 Reliability of Systems 127 
6.14.2 Fault Tree Analysis 128 
6.14.3 Electrical and Mechanical Equipment failure and Modeling 129 
5.14.4 Modeling Simple Failure Rates in GoldSim™ 129 
6.14.5 Cumulative Failure Mode 130 
6.14.6 The Fragility curve 131 
6.14.7 Electrical Failure 133 
6.15 Repair Time Distributions Used for the LMR 134 
6.16 Method of Modeling : Fault tree Analysis 135 
vi 
6.17 BACKGROUND TO GOLDSIM™ AND THE RELIABILITY MODULE 135 
6.17.1 Why Predict RAMS? 136 
6.18 Modeling Little Long Spillway Reliability 137 
6.19 Gate Operations AND Results Analysis 140 
6.20 Gate Reliabilities 150 
6.20 Disturbances 155 
6.20.1 External Disturbances 156 
6.20.2 Potential Environmental Conditions Likely Effects on the LMR 157 
6.20.3 Modeling the Inherent disturbances 160 
6.20.4 Icing effect on flow control 161 
6.20.5 Modeling Ice Storms Disturbance 162 
6.20.6 Modeling floating Ice 166 
6.20.7 Simplified Thermal Analyses 166 
7.0   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 169 
7.1 Summary 169 




















LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: DAM SAFETY HAZARD POTENTIAL CLASSIFICATION 7 
TABLE 2: REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION TABLE ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.36 
TABLE 3: POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS LMR COMPLEX 158 
TABLE 4: DOWN TIMES AND REPAIR TIMES OF COMPONENT FAILURES 163 




INTRODUCTION:  ON THE SYSTEMS RLIABILITY MODELING APPROACH 
TO RISK ANALYSIS IN DAM SAFTY 
 
Each dam is unique. The site, purpose of the dam, materials available for construction, 
state-of-practice when the dam was constructed, engin er’s experience and knowledge, 
and many other factors combine to create structures that are as individual as people. The 
consequence of failure of each dam is also unique. At one end of the spectrum are large 
dams upstream of major population centers with thousands of people at risk. At the other 
end are the many small dams that have little to no consequences if they were to fail. The 
combination of site, design, project-specific operational requirements, and consequences 
makes the risk associated with each dam unique and in most cases very complex.  
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, the cause of 
many serious accidents in hydropower plants has shifted from natural causes to human 
and technology-related causes as these systems get mor  complex. While natural disasters 
still account for a significant amount of human and material losses, man-made disasters 
are responsible for an increasingly large portion of the toll, especially in a safety critical 
domain such as hydropower generation. The reliable performance of a hydraulic flow-
control system such as dams, reservoirs, etc. depens o  the time-varying demands 
placed upon it by hydrology, operating rules, the interactions among a cascade of 
reservoirs, the vagaries of operator interventions a d natural disturbances (Baecher, 
2014). In the past, engineers have concerned themselves with understanding how the 
component parts of dam systems operate individually nd not how the components 
interact with one another. Dams and their associated flow control are highly complex 




complex ways that are not amenable to such simple decompositional analysis, and thus 
need to be understood in a systems engineering context. 
Contemporary engineering practices do not address many common causes of accidents 
and failures, which are unforeseen combinations of usual conditions. In recent decades, 
the most likely causes of fatalities associated with dams have more often had to do with 
sensor and control systems, human agency, and inadequ te maintenance than with 
extreme loads such as floods and earthquakes. Research on dam failures and safety 
related incidents has shown that most dam failures w re not caused by a single, easily 
analyzed, component failure but rather by interactions between various components and 
subsystems. To throw more light on this, Accidents and failures usually occur due to the 
un-foreseen confluence of more common and individually benign events, which in 
combination can be catastrophic(Baecher, 2014).  
A “new approach” was proposed which combines simulation, engineering reliability 
modeling, and systems engineering. This new approach seeks to explore the possibilities 
inherent in taking a systems approach to modeling the reliability of flow-control 
functions and dam systems. The approach takes into acc unt interconnections and 
dependences between different components of the syst m, changes over time in their 
state as well as the influence upon the system of organizational limitations, human errors 
and external disturbances. The method attempts to bring together the systems aspects of 
engineering and operational concerns in a way that emphasizes their interactions.  
On-going research by the Spillway Systems Reliability Project (SSRP) on this proposed 
systems engineering approach has been a complex multi-year effort entirely coded in 




optimized for engineering reliability modeling such as GoldSim™ and RENO™, there was 
a need to test these platforms to investigate whether i  offers an overall better program 
interface and customizability than the Mat lab platform.  
The research centers on the use of GoldSim™ Simulation engine and its extensions to 
model at component and subcomponent level, the reliabl  performance of the entire dam 
system. The modeling approach holistically integrates river basin hydrology, the routing 
of reservoir inflows through the reservoir system, operating rules and human factors of 
operating the spillway and other waterways, out flow systems, the hydraulics of outflow, 
the discharge to the downstream river channel and the fragility of the structural, 
mechanical and electrical components of the dam system. Emphasis is placed on the 
interactions of this set of components and how unforeseen combinations of varying 
conditions may lead to failure of dam system. The Lowe Mattagami River Hydroelectric 
complex is used as a case study for this research. The present goal of this study is to 
understand how the interactions of systems components and subcomponents, control and 
combine to affect performance, and the potential for accidents and failures; thus, how 
simple but unforeseen chains of events might combine to affect the ability to control 
flows.  
The final objective of this dissertation is to incorp rate all the different aspects of dams 
operations into a single systems model which can be broken down and analyzed at the 
component and subcomponent level. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to 
identify and model the dynamic feedback processes that may cause risk to increase over 
time into the overall model. This dissertation introduces a systems framework to model 




CHAPTER 1: RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN DAM SAFETY-LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
1.1 UNDERSTANDING HOW DAMS FAIL 
A dam is a barrier that impounds water or underground streams. Dams generally serve 
the primary purpose of retaining water. Dams are built for many purposes including 
power supply, transportation, water supply, flood control, recreation, industrial and 
agricultural uses, fire protection, low flow augmentation, storage of slurries, storage of 
tailings and storage of industrial wastes. Dams can be made of concrete, timber cribs 
filled with rocks, stone blocks, steel sheet piling, or they can be formed from 
embankments of earth, rock fill or solid waste products such as tailings.  While other 
structures such as floodgates or levees (also known as dikes) are used to manage or 
prevent water flow into specific land regions. Hydropower and pumped-storage 
hydroelectricity are often used in conjunction with dams to generate electricity. Types of 
dams include water storage reservoirs, locks, weirs, mine tailings dams, and levees. 
Dam failure is the uncontrolled release of impounded water or other stored material 
resulting in downstream flooding, which can affect life and property.  Dams can fail with 
little warning. Intense storms may produce a flood in a few hours or even minutes for 
upstream locations. Flash floods can occur within six hours of the beginning of heavy 
rainfall, and dam failure may occur within hours of the first signs of breaching. Other 
failures and breaches can take much longer to occur, from days to weeks, as a result of 
debris jams, the accumulation of melting snow, buildup of water pressure on a dam with 
(unknown) deficiencies after days of heavy rain, etc. Flooding can also occur when a dam 




attention to dam safety is vital to protect downstream life, property and habitat. Safety 
concerns include sinkholes, seepage, internal erosion and seismic issues. 
The consequences of a dam failure can vary from none t  major. For example a minor 
overtopping that is remedied quickly has low consequences. Without immediate 
attention, the dam may further erode, leading to a complete breach and major 
consequences in many ways. Some potential consequences include the following: 
• Loss of life; 
• Damage to homes, businesses, transportation networks, lifelines, utilities, schools 
industrial facilities and other improvements; 
• Damage to the environment; 
• Threat to other dams located downstream that can result in cascade failures; 
• Loss of stored materials; 
• Loss of use of the dam; 
• Loss of economic benefit from the dam; 
• Loss of the capital investment to the dam’s owner; 
• Fines to the owner; 
• Criminal charges to owner or designer; 
• Lawsuits and other litigation; 
• Destruction of the owner’s business; and 







1.2   OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING POTENTIAL FAILURE IN DAMS 
An examination of dam failures and safety related incidents shows that most were not 
caused by a single, easily analyzed, component failure but rather by interactions between 
various components, operational considerations, and l ck of appropriate organizational 
response (Paul C. Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2007). It is imperative to reduce the risk 
associated with a dam to a level that is as low as re onably practicable. The optimum 
must done within the associated operating constraints a d within the limits of current 
knowledge and understanding, to recognize potential fa lure modes before they begin to 
develop and to monitor those failure modes over time. To achieve this goal, dam owners 
must find an effective way to integrate operations, engineering, and dam safety 
performance monitoring into a comprehensive dam safety program. Performance 
monitoring and record keeping are essential to making well-informed decisions regarding 
the condition of the dam. As the systems that control dams get more complex and more 
automated, and more are remotely operated, opportunities increase for undetected 
incidents that can lead to dam failure. Understanding factors relating to dam safety, such 
as owner risk awareness, management responsibility, personnel training, and system and 
sub-system interactions, are become increasingly important. 
 
1.1.1   DEFINITION OF HAZARD 
Dam failures and incidents of most concern involve unintended or uncontrolled releases 
or surges of impounded water. It may also involve a tot l collapse of the dam but that is 




overtopping of a dam or other problems may result in a hazardous situation being created. 
In some cases, it is an unintended consequence of th  dam’s operations. 
During the last 40 to 50 years, the general understanding of how dams fail has progressed 
sufficiently to provide guidance for dam engineers and builders to help prevent similar 
failures. Lessons learned were codified and design practices standardized. However, 
dams continue to fail. Forensic examinations of recent dam failures often reveal that 
failures were not due to a single flaw but rather wre due to a complex linking of dam 
condition, operational circumstances, flaws or errors that combined to result in failure, or 
unknowns that were not detected until after the failure. This linkage of “conditions” and 
“other factors” is one possible description of a “filure mode.” 
Various regulatory agencies have established a hazard potential rating system based on 
the consequences of a dam failure. As an example, Table 1 presents the hazard potential 
classification system for dams, which was developed by the U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers National Inventory of Dams (2011). The Interagency Committee on Dam 
Safety (2004) provides background materials, which supports these designations. 
Hazard Potential 
Classification 
Loss of Human Life Economic, Environmental, 
Lifeline Losses 
Low None Expected 
 Low and Generally limited to 
owner 
Significant No probable loss of life Yes 
High 
Probable that one or more 
lives lost 
Yes (But not necessary for this 
classification) 





Loss of human life potential is based upon inundation mapping of the area downstream of 
the project. Analysis of loss of life potential should take into account the population at 
risk, time of flood wave travel and wave height, and warning time. Indirect threats to life 
caused by the interruption of lifeline services due to dam failure or operation, i.e. direct 
loss of critical medical facilities, should also beconsidered. Economic, environmental, 
and lifeline impacts should be evaluated based on the incremental flood wave produced 
by dam failure, beyond which would normally be expected for the magnitude of the flood 
event which the failure occurs. 
Typical dam hazard potential classifications can vary with regulatory jurisdiction; Hazard 
potential classification can be described more generally as follows. 
Low Hazard Potential dams are located in areas where failure will damage nothing 
more than isolated buildings, undeveloped lands, or town or county roads and/or will 
cause no substantial economic loss or substantial environmental damage. Loss of human 
life is not expected. 
Economic, environmental, and lifeline impacts are considered to be low and generally 
limited to the owner. 
Significant Hazard Potential dams are located in areas where failure may damage 
isolated homes, main highways and minor railroads, interrupt the use of relatively 
important public utilities and/or will cause substanti l economic loss or substantial 
environmental damage. 
High Hazard Potential dams are located in areas where failure may cause los  of human 




utilities, main highways or railroads and/or will cause extensive economic or 
environmental losses. 
In addition to its hazard potential, a dam may exist in different performance states. Many 
dams operate in very safe and well defined conditions. Others may have problems that 
require more attention and response. Three performance states are used in this document 
to help define the scope of a dam safety monitoring pro ram. 
Normal – performance is within the design parameters withno anomalous behavior and 
no indicators of undesirable performance and is expected to remain in this state for the 
near future. 
Caution – performance is outside the range expected in the design, or anomalous 
behavior not anticipated in the design is occurring, or an indicator of undesirable 
performance is occurring at an increasing rate. 
Alert – performance is in a range where safety of the dam is in question, or performance 
is deteriorating and not controllable (Paul C. Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2013). 
 
1.1.2   POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES 
A potential failure mode is any means by which any component of a dam may fail to 
perform its intended function. Understanding potential failure modes for dams is the basis 
of a good dam safety program (Regan et al., 2008; USSD, 2002). 
Dam failures may be caused by structural deficiencies in the dam itself. These may come 
from poor initial design or construction, lack of maintenance and repair, the gradual 
weakening of the dam through the normal aging processes, or the development of an 




factors including, but not limited to, debris blocking the spillway, flooding, earthquakes, 
volcanic lava flows, landslides, improper operation, vandalism, or terrorism (Paul C. 
Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2013). 
Dam failures can result from any one or a combination of the following conditions: 
• Prolonged periods of rainfall and flooding, which cause most failures; 
• Inadequate spillway capacity, resulting in overtopping of the embankment; 
• Internal erosion caused by loss of soil from the int rior of the dam or its foundation; 
animal burrow impacts on earthen dams; 
• External erosion due to lack of maintenance; 
• Improper maintenance, including failure to remove tr es, repair internal seepage 
problems, or maintain gates, valves, and other operational components; 
• Improper design or use of construction materials; 
• Failure of upstream dams in the same drainage basin; 
• Landslides into reservoirs, which cause surges that result in substantial erosion or 
overtopping; 
• Destructive acts of terrorists; and, 
• Earthquakes, which typically cause longitudinal cr cks at the tops of the embankments, 
leading to structural failure. 
 
1.1.3 DAM LIFE PHASES 
USSD (2008) describes the life of a dam as having several distinct phases. Performance 





1. Design phase; Field investigation work typically provides the information for basic 
characterizing of the geology and materials at and round the dam site. Instrumentation 
used in the design phase helps establish baseline conditions for design and may also is 
used during construction and first filling to monitor and evaluate changes in baseline 
conditions. Typical monitoring during this phase might include monitoring to establish 
existing ground water conditions and movement of any potentially unstable areas. 
Instrumentation may be used in the design phase to provide information on key 
performance parameters for the dam. For example, slope  with weak zones might be 
instrumented to verify design strength for the weak materials. This instrumentation might 
be incorporated into the long-term monitoring phase  well. 
2. Construction phase; Issues that come up during the construction phase of a new dam, 
or during the modification of an existing dam, involve confirmation of design parameters, 
changes in groundwater and stability conditions on site and at adjacent sites, worker 
safety, and construction quality control. This information can become especially 
important if design modifications are required as a result of unexpected performance. 
This is the phase where most of the instrumentation used is dams is installed. These 
instruments may be used to monitor performance during construction, first filling, steady 
state operation of the dam, and extreme loading. 
3. First reservoir filling phase; the first filling phase is one time in the life of the dam 
when visual surveillance and instrumentation monitoring are imperative. As the reservoir 
is filled, the seepage resistance of the dam, foundation, abutments, and reservoir rim is 
being tested for the first time. Full reservoir load lso tests the structural strength and 




• provide an early indication of unusual or unexpected performance, 
• provide confirmation of satisfactory performance of the design and construction, 
• provide information and data so that actual performance of the dam under reservoir load 
is better understood, 
• identify elements that need further examination. 
4. Long-term (or normal operations) phase; Performance monitoring during the long-term 
(normal operations) phase has a similar role to the first filling phase. At this point in the 
life of the dam, a significant body of information has most likely been developed. This 
can be used to identify the dam safety issues of current concern. These issues may be 
significantly different that those existing prior to initial filling. Therefore, a new 
assessment of the areas of concern and the informati n that should be provided by the 
monitoring program may be appropriate. Additional instrumentation may be warranted 
for areas with unexpected performance. Some instrumentation may be retired if it no 
longer serves a purpose. This might be the case for slope inclinometers used to monitor 
horizontal movements of the dam’s slopes and its foundation for stability during 
construction. 
 
1.1.4 OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING POTENTIAL FAILURE IN DAMS 
An examination of dam failures and safety related incidents shows that most were not 
caused by a single, easily analyzed, component failure but rather by interactions between 
various components, operational considerations, and l ck of appropriate organizational 
response. In order to reduce the risk associated with a dam to a level that is as low as 




and understanding, to recognize potential failure modes before they begin to develop and 
to monitor those failure modes over time. To achieve this goal, dam owners must find an 
effective way to integrate operations, engineering, and dam safety performance 
monitoring into a comprehensive dam safety program. Performance monitoring and 
record keeping are essential to making well-informed d cisions regarding the condition 
of the dam. Ideally, dam information would be readily available and organized for a 
straightforward and timely assessment of the condition of the dam. Within the context of 
dam safety, information collected from instruments, physical observations, photographs, 
design drawings, stability calculations, field explorations, and operational and 
maintenance history should be combined into a single readily accessible folder to allow 
the engineer, policy maker, and dam safety official to make informed decisions relating 
to the condition and/or operation of a dam. Collecting data and filing it is not a 
replacement for sound engineering judgment and experience. Performance monitoring 
documentation is a tool to help track information and its change over time and to support 
sound engineering judgment and informed decision making. As the systems that control 
our dams get more complex and more automated, and more are remotely operated, the 
opportunities increase for undetected incidents that c n lead to dam failure. 
Understanding factors relating to dam safety, such as owner risk awareness, management 






1.2   DAM SYSTEMS 
Dam systems for flow control is made up of a broad set of components such as structures, 
equipment, sensors, communication facilities, personnel, management arrangements and 
policies that enable the handling of water flows through the reservoir and past the 
relevant dam to the downstream reach of river (Leveson, 2011). Discharges from 
upstream reservoirs and natural precipitation in the (local) catchment result in inflows to 
the reservoir. The reservoir is ponded behind a damto serve as a buffer for time-varying 
upstream inflows to harmonize the availability of water or electricity with the demand 
(Baecher, 2014). Water may be drawn from a reservoir through structures designed for 
free surface flow or closed conduit flow. Most (but not all) waterways built for discharge 
of large flows, such as flood spillways, are of theformer type. Low-level (bottom) outlets 
and power intakes are on the other hand (usually) designed for closed conduit flow in 
some part. Discharge facilities are adapted to different operating requirements; some can 
be regulated, others not; some are temporary, others p manent; there are service and 
auxiliary spillways, sediment outlets, fish passages, navigation canals and locks, etc. 
In many discharge facilities, gates and valves acting as movable water barriers, may 
actively control and regulate the amount of water drawn from the reservoir. Gated 
spillways generally permit the use of a larger live storage than do un-gated spillways, 
which is often economically favorable. On the other and, gates are critically sensitive 
components of dam systems and gated waterways cannot be expected always to be 
available on demand. Modern dams usually are equipped with automated supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) equipment, someti es referred to as distributed 
control systems. These com-bine sensors with industrial controllers, computers, and data 




even automatic control of components of the flow-contr l system. The consequences of 
failure of SCADA systems can be dramatic. As a result, hardware and software for 
SCADA systems in dam and reservoir operations are usually ruggedized to withstand 
temperature, vibration, and voltage extremes, and are enhanced by having redundant 
hardware and communications capabilities. Programming errors and component failures 
may still incapacitate SCADA systems. SCADA systems provide for human operator 
control, both remote control from dispatch centres and local on-site control. Operators are 
always important in dam operations, including flow control. As a result, also human 
operators may cause mistakes or introduce errors of commission or omission into 
operation of dam systems, either without intent or, less commonly, out of malice. Human 
operators may also take actions that may be, or that they believe to be, in concert with 
operating policy, yet which may lead to mal-operation. 
The combination of electrical generators and hydraulic turbines allows hydropower 
systems to convert the potential energy of dammed or flowing water into storable 
electrical output. Although this conversion relies on relatively simple mechanical 
properties, the system employed to achieve it is often complex in its design and 
capabilities.  
 
1.3   CURRENT STATE OF THE PRACTICE 
Contemporary dam safety decision-making generally falls into one or more of the 
following categories:  
• Standards-based decision making,  




• Probabilistic risk analysis. 
1.3.1   STANDARDS-BASED DECISION-MAKING  
By definition, a standards-based system provides a specific standard, factor of safety, 
against which the result of an analysis is measured. Standards-based decisions are 
essentially decisions based on engineering principles and norms that employ a form of 
design checking against stated criteria. Standards have been developed over many years 
in an attempt to cover favorable performance and avoid unfavorable performance. 
Typical standards-based decision-making is well exemplified by many state and federal 
dam safety guidelines where sections are devoted to determining the Probable Maximum 
Flood (PMF); selecting the Inflow Design Flood (IDF); and analyzing concrete gravity, 
embankment and arch dams against defined factors of safety for three loading conditions 
(normal, flood and seismic), etc (Regan, 2010).  
The factor of safety (FS) is the common design check against deterministic engineering 
standards. The factor of safety measures the ratio of the strength (capacity) of a dam to 




Intuitively, a factor of safety less than 1.0 suggests means that the dam will not be able to 
perform its intended function under the demand of the loads placed upon it. Alternatively, 
a factor of safety of 1.0 or higher suggests the dam is sufficiently strong to withstand the 
specified demand. The typical rule in dam design is to make the factor of safety 
sufficiently larger than one to account for uncertainties in both the specified demand and 




physical properties of a dam, in that the larger th factor of safety, the greater the capacity 
of the dam to with-stand the applied loads. 
Quantitative engineering standards are usually promulgated by regulatory authorities, 
even though they are typically taken from industry practices, by standards-setting 
professional organizations approved by government; by the industry; or more indirectly 
in terms of guidance provided by non-governmental organizations such as the national 
member bodies of ICOLD (Baecher, 2014).  Current dam safety practice is usually 
predicated on the rare occurrences of extreme loads, such as unlikely but possible 
reservoir inflows or powerful seismic events.   
Engineering standards based decision making has evolved ver the years but it’s focus 
still remains on the physical structure, not on operations, data collection, communications 
or operations(Baecher, 2014). Loading scenarios are ass ssed separately: meaning the 
capacity of spillways and other waterways is considere  to the extent that they are large 
enough and stable enough to accommodate specified discharges; the mechanical and 
electrical performance of gates and valves are considered to the extent of their 
availability on demand. Analytical criteria for the internal erosion of embankment dams 
have improved somewhat since that era, but still today, operational factors, SCADA 
system errors, and human factors have little place in engineering-standards based 
assessment of dam safety(Baecher, 2014). 
 
1.3.2   RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING 
Risk-informed dam safety programs provide many benefits. However, according to 




based decision making in that the focus is on the lev l of protection to the public from the 
hazardous dam and reservoir.” In contrast, in standards-based decision making the 
hazards are the natural and other conditions that threa en the dam.  What generally passes 
for a risk-informed approach might more accurately be described as traditional standards-
based rational with a probabilistic outlook. 
Risk-informed decision-making implies taking into consideration a probabilistic 
description of the natural and other hazards imposed on, and the fragility of, the dam 
system, as well as the quantitative consequences of accidents or failures, in making 
decisions about dam safety, in a way that is focused on the totality of the level of 
protection to the public (Baecher, 2014). Within this context, risk is taken to be the 
expected consequences of accidents or failures, that is, the product of the probability of 
an accident or failure, and the resultant consequences of that accident or failure. Risk-
informed decision making involves balancing the expected economic, social, and 
environmental costs of a dam safety risk against the costs of risk reduction, at least in a 
qualitative way. 
The shortcomings of this approach is its inability to assess non-linear failure modes and 
interactions between apparently unrelated components a d subsystems. This hinders the 
identification of opportunities to prevent failures before they progress to the point where 
a typical risk analysis would begin (Regan, 2010). This linear nature of typical risk 
assessment approaches, combined with the fact that the majority of dam safety 
professionals are civil engineers, results in a rather narrow focus on failure modes that 
affect the civil structures and a neglect of the contributions to those failure modes from 





1.3.3   PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS (PRA) 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) provides practic l techniques for predicting and 
managing risks (i.e., frequencies and severities of adverse consequences) in many 
complex engineered systems. 
Risk-based decision making differs from risk-informed decision making in that it relies 
on the quantitative evaluation of the probabilities of accidents and failures, and of their 
corresponding consequences, in order to calculate quantitative risk.  In the literatures of 
techno-logical risk management, risk-based decision making is often referred to as 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The principal methodologies of PRA are fault-tree and 
event-tree analysis.  The former is more common in uclear and chemical plant safety.  
The latter is more common in dam safety and civil infrastructure risk analysis.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a technique whose mathematical foundation is well-
developed and that has been applied extensively in reliability and safety assessments for a 
wide range of engineered systems such as missile launch systems, chemical process 
facilities, nuclear power plants, dams, control systems and computers. In addition, the 
software and the databases available for conducting a FTA are sophisticated and add 
significantly to the efficiency of performing a risk analysis.  The fault tree is a graphical 
construct that shows the logical interaction among the elements of a system whose failure 
individually or in combination could contribute to he occurrence of a defined undesired 
event such as a system failure. Fault trees offer th  analyst the capability to construct a 
logic model of a system that is visual and therefore is easy to view and read, and that 




It is important to note at the outset that FTA is one of many tools available to the risk 
analysis team. In a risk analysis for a dam system, various methods will generally be used 
to build a logic structure to analyze the expected future performance. As such, FTA will 
simply be one of the methods used. In the course of the risk assessment it is important to 
co-ordinate how a FTA for a system fits into the overall risk analysis model. This theme 
is critical to the risk analysis in general and to the FTA in particular.  
Event tree analysis (ETA) is one of the techniques available to the engineer conducting a 
reliability or safety analysis for a dam. It is an pparently straightforward endeavor that 
finds widespread application in many industries andbusinesses. It is an inductive type of 
analysis that, unlike fault tree analysis, is not supported by an extensive theoretical basis. 
ETA is the most widely used form of analysis in risk analysis for dam safety, although 
the lack of theoretical basis means that the correctness of these constructs may be 
difficult to determine.  
An ETA is an analysis process whose essential component is the event tree. The event 
tree is a graphical construct that shows the logical sequence of the occurrence of events 
that is visual and therefore is easy to view and read, and that provides a qualitative and 
quantitative insight to the system’s operations and reliability. 
Current dam safety practice, both in the traditional deterministic form and in the more 
modern probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) form using fault trees and event trees, is still 
usually based on the rare occurrences of extreme loads, such as unlikely but possible 
reservoir inflows or powerful seismic events.  Adding PRA to the evaluation changes this 
situation not at all.  As an example, the Canadian D m Association (CDA) guidelines for 




independent events. Each has some probability of occurring in any given year, and each 
has some probability of leading to an accident or failure. This is the same whether in 
standards-based evaluation or in PRA. Indeed, from a geophysical view, these natural 
phenomena likely are probabilistically independent. The occurrence of one does nothing 
to change the probability of occurrence of the other.  
From an operational and safety view, however, earthquakes and floods are not 
independent. If an earthquake occurs and causes seriou  damage to a dam system, it may 
take a year or more for repairs to be completed.  
1.4   ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
A dam is not a single independent entity but rather its system comprising of the dam body 
and the waterways past the dam, usually with accompanying mechanical and electrical 
equipment for on-site operational control. A dam may also be considered to include the 
reservoir, communication links, and the organization responsible for operation of the 
system, including on-site operators, dispatch center and company policy makers.  This 
system is made up of several subsystems for instance the spillway subsystem will include 
the gates and its complete hoist and control system, he spillway chute and the stilling 
basin. Thus the dam system would include all the subsystems that we normally associate 
with a dam: i.e., the foundation, abutments, reservoir, and reservoir rim, the operating 
organization and may also include a powerhouse and all its associated subsystems. 
The state and nature of these components and sub components will not remain constant 
during the lifetime of a dam system for reasons such as wear and aging and maintenance 




scale, a dam might be a subsystem within a larger system that could be a watershed with 
projects owned by one or more entities or an entire regional electrical grid. 
 
1.4.1 NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY 
This concept was developed by Charles Perrow in his book Normal Accidents (1984), in 
which he uses the term normal accidents in part as a synonym for “inevitable accidents.” 
This categorization is based on a combination of features of such systems: interactive 
complexity and tight coupling. Normal accidents in a particular system may be common 
or rare, but the system's characteristics make it inherently vulnerable to such accidents, 
hence their description as “normal”. 
NAT suggests that high risk systems have some special characteristics including complex 
interactions, dependencies and performance conditios hat make it essentially impossible 
to foresee all possible failures, especially when one “minor” failure interacts with one or 
more other “minor” failures in an unforeseen manner. Since the failure of some parts is 
unavoidable, some failures must be expected and should be considered “Normal”. Perrow 
advocates a focus on the overall system rather than individual components. Failure in just 
one part (material, sub-system, human, or organization) may coincide with the failure of 
an entirely different part, revealing hidden connections, neutralized redundancies, random 
occurrences etc., for which no engineer or manager could reasonably plan. 
Historically dams were operated by dam operators residing near the dam and working 
almost exclusively to assure the safe and reliable op ration of the dam. Economic and 
Socio-political pressures, brought about in large part by deregulation of the electric 




remote operations control center (Regan, 2010). Thus, man operators on site have been 
consequently replaced with SCADA (Supervision, Contr l and Data Acquisition) which 
is composed of but not limited to river gauges upstream of the reservoir, gauges within 
the reservoir and gauges at the spillway. At the control center one or more operators (no 
longer dam tenders) make decisions on dam operations based on information obtained 
from SCADA systems without directly seeing the structure. In addition, an operator’s 
principal responsibilities are often primarily relat d to operation of one or more 
powerhouses with dam safety as an additional responsibility (Regan, 2010). 
Likewise, spillway gates are now rarely operated by a dam operator on site. Presently, a 
remote operator may click a virtual button on a computer screen. In the first case, the dam 
tender gets immediate visual feedback that the proper gate is indeed moving or not. In the 
second case, the remote operator gets a signal that the gate is moving from some form of 
position sensor. If the sensor is giving erroneous data, the operator has no real knowledge 
if the gate is moving or how far it is moving (Regan, 2010). 
When we bring the causes of technological accidents up to closer scrutiny in a bid to 
understand them the inherent causes, it’s often very difficult to pinpoint what exactly 
went wrong. The reason for this is that technologies are intrinsically complex and depend 
on many things working closely together: Materials nd components of different quality 
are structured into tightly engineered sub-systems, which are operated by error-prone 
humans in not always optimal organizational structures, which in turn are subject to 





Normal Accidents was first published in 1984, prior t  the deregulation of the electric 
industry and prior to the large-scale introduction of remote operation of dams. These two 
factors Dams as Systems have greatly increased the complexity of dam operation and 
have introduced opportunities for unforeseen interactions that did not previously exist. 
Therefore, the author believes that dams today would more properly be plotted between 
power grids (as plotted by Perrow in 1984) and nuclear power plants in the upper right 
quadrant. 
Charles Perrow, the author of Normal Accident Theory, came to the conclusion that 
“some technologies, such as nuclear power, should simply be abandoned because they are 
not worth the risk.”  This political statement has made Normal Accident Theory highly 
controversial, and the main body of research has since then concentrated on how to make 
organizations and high-risk technologies more reliable, i.e. 'disaster proof', so that the 
political and democratically important discussion of allowing or not allowing specific 
technologies not needs to be taken. 
 
1.4.2 HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
Subsequent researchers challenged Perrow’s theory, and in particular his conclusions 
regarding the inevitability of accidents. Another school of thought, High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO), argues that four key organization l characteristics: 1) prioritization 
of safety and performance and achieving a consensus on the goals throughout the 
organization; 2) promoting a culture of reliability; 3) organizational learning to learn 
from accidents and safety related incidents; and 4) use of redundancy. Advocates of HRO 




Critics of the HRO theory point out that simultaneously promoting safety and 
performance, i.e. dam safety and powerhouse generation creates conflicting priorities. 
HRO describes a subset of hazardous organizations that enjoy a high level of safety over 
long periods of time. What distinguishes types of high-risk systems is the source of risk, 
whether it is the technical or social factors that the system must control or whether the 
environment, itself, constantly changes. Promoting reliability is often taken to mean 
training all employees on exactly the steps to take in a safety related incident. 
Unfortunately, this can mean, at times, that the employees do exactly what they’ve been 
trained to do but the specific incident was outside th  understanding of those who 
prepared the training and the response actually hastens the incident due to unforeseen 
interactions. Learning from our past clearly has its place in any dam safety program but 
this is due mainly to the fact that our industry has istorically evolved at a relatively slow 
rate. The recent development of SCADA systems that allow remote operation of dams is 
a radical departure from the historical developments i  dam design and operation. We 
have little to no history to help us understand the risks inherent in remote operation of 
dams. It is notable that many of our recent experiences with uncontrolled releases of 
water are due to unintended operation of outlet works by glitches in SCADA systems, an 
area where the dam safety community has relatively little history. The last concern with 
HRO is its emphasis on redundancy, a fact that may increase complexity and thereby 






1.5 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Another school of thought that has gathered momentum d e to the advances made in 
computing power over the last 3 decades is the Systems Engineering approach. Systems 
theory dates back to the 1930’s and 1940’s and was a response to the limitations of the 
classical analysis techniques in coping with increasingly complex systems starting to be 
built at that time (Leveson, 2011). Bell Telephone laboratories developed systems 
engineering in the 1940s as a response to the need to valuate the properties of a system 
as a whole, which in complex technologies, can be very different from the sum of the 
properties of the individual component properties. Systems engineering advocates a high 
level, top-down, view of the system and the relationships between technical, 
organizational and social aspects. Systems engineering is a multi-disciplinary approach 
that enables the successful realization and deployment of systems, however simple or 
complex they may be. The systems approach to assessing the performance and safety of 
dams is familiar from the perspective of dam design, a d yet unfamiliar from the 
perspective of dam safety assessment (Baecher, 2014).   
 
1.5.1 DAMS AS ENGINEERED SYSTEMS 
Safety approaches based on systems theory consider accidents as arising from the 
interactions among system components. This systems approach treats safety as an 
emergent property that arises when the system components interact within an 
environment. Dams are engineered systems that are set in a natural environment, as such, 
the dam system comprising the dam and appurtenant structures, reservoir, foundations, 




A dam system is made up of mainly the dam body and the waterways past the dam, 
usually with accompanying mechanical and electrical equipment for on-site operational 
control, but may also be considered to include the reservoir, communication links, and 
the organization responsible for operation of the system, including on-site operators, 
dispatch center and company policy makers.  The stat  and nature of these components 
will not remain constant during the lifetime of a dm system for reasons such as wear and 
aging and maintenance activities as well as changes to the surrounding infra-structure and 
society. If a dam is described as a dam system, then t re could be the powerhouse 
included, since this object belongs to the key structures when we think about dams as 
systems (Baecher, 2014) .  
As discussed earlier, criteria-based decision-making processes analyze a few specific 
components such as the dam body as a whole to determine if it meets applicable criteria 
under various loading conditions and the spillway to determine if it will safely pass the 
inflow design flood. Risk-informed processes do essentially the same thing, except they 
estimate a probability of occurrence for the failure and, rather than just compare the 
results of an analysis to a specific criterion, include an evaluation of consequences in 
assessing if the risk is tolerable. In either case we are essentially trying to determine the 
safety of a dam by examining a few components of the dam, one at a time, in isolation 
from other components. An examination of dam failures and safety related incidents 
shows that most were not caused by a single, easily nalyzed, component failure but 
rather by interactions between various components ad subsystems. In order to drive the 




be done, within the limits of current knowledge and understanding, to recognize these 
systemic failure modes prior to an incident or failure. 
The safety and reliability of flow control systems at dams relate not only to fields such as 
hydrology and hydraulics, but also to geological, structural, mechanical and electrical 
engineering describing the current state of the system, and to supervisory control 
(SCADA), and human factors. Even though probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) usually 
deals only with the rare occurrences of extreme loads, in principle it can accommodate 
less extreme events such as the blockage of spillway openings by floating debris and the 
unavailability of gates to open on demand. Nonethelss, PRA suffers the significant 
limitation that only specifically identified and enumerated chains of events, enter an 
analysis. An unforeseen or unusual combination of fairly usual conditions that is not 
specifically identified and enumerated will not affect the outcome of a PRA. 
The consideration of accident or failure scenarios esulting from chains of events not 
specifically identified requires a new approach. This approach sees dams as systems and 
includes the effects of successive or sudden changes of state due to operational and 
maintenance activities, human and organizational factors, laws, policies and procedures, 
all of which occur in varying environmental conditions. 
The key considerations in a systems engineering appro ch are: 
• The capabilities of the system;   
• How these capabilities are achieved; and  
• The environment in which the system functions.  
The capabilities of the system, specifically, are th products and services that the system 





1.6 THESIS SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES  
Just  as  solving  an  engineering  or  system  safety  problem  requires the  definition  of  
system  boundaries, writing a dissertation requires th  definition of the problem scope, as 
well as the  boundaries of the systems and factors to be included in the tentative problem 
solution. The focus of this thesis is on demonstrating how the proposed systems modeling 
approach can be applied to analyzing the reliability of dam Systems.   The objective is to 
demonstrate via a systems modeling framework, how reliability of dams can be analyzed 
holistically. Within the systems modeling framework, the salient aspects/components of 
the entire system will be identified and modeled so a  to enable the replication of real life 
scenario factors that contribute to risk in the development and operation of complex 
engineering systems.   
Most  of  the  techniques  upon  which  this  work  is  predicated  are  derived  from 
system  safety  engineering,  system  theory,  reliability theory,  and  system  dynamics.   
The definition of safety used throughout this thesis includes not only risks associated 
with human life, but also risks associated with dam failure, equipment loss and 
environmental damage. 
Based on this defined boundary, the study concentrat s on: 
a. The spillway gates; 
b. The spillway gate controls, drives and hoists; 
c. Spillway operations, both local and remote; 




e. Power Generation; 
f. Instrumentation; 
The set boundaries will enable the river basin hydrology, the routing of reservoir inflows 
through the reservoir system, operating rules and human factors of operating the spillway 
and other waterways, out flow systems, the hydraulics of outflow, the discharge to the 
downstream river channel and the fragility of the structural, mechanical and electrical 
components of the dam system to be holistically integrated into the model. Emphasis is 
placed on the interactions of this set of components/sub components and how unforeseen 
combinations of varying conditions may lead to failure of dam system. The Lower 
Mattagami cascade of four dams is the case study on this this research is predicated. 
 
1.6.1 THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this study is to report on the current advancements made on the 
application of systems reliability modeling approach in dam systems and also to 
promulgate the use of a systems modeling framework in the analysis of the performance 
of hydraulic flow control systems. The main objective s to balance the main aspects of 
dam operation, performance and reliability into an integrated whole. That integrated 
whole comprises the natural siting of the dam in its hydrology and geology, the physics 
of water containment and the control and the control of discharges and power generation, 
and the monitoring and control of operations.   
To achieve this goal, one needs to take a systems view on the analysis of function and 




analysis according to different fields, that is, analysis being divided among the isolated 
fiefdoms of different specialists (Baecher, 2014). The specialties and methods of analysis 
used today are still absolutely required, but need to be supplemented with an improved 
overview of how things come together and influence each other. 
The philosophy of systems engineering as a whole has two essential attributes:  
• Structural performance and resilience; and  
• Functional performance and resilience.  
Structural performance and resilience pertain to the ability of the dam to withstand the 
forces that are applied to it and to maintain the structural support and integrity required 
for the functions of the dam and reservoir. Functional performance and resilience pertain 
to processes, products and services that the dam is intended to provide. Specifically, the 
dam is intended to retain the stored volume and to pass all flows through and around the 
dam in a controlled manner. 
The systems approach also gives consideration to the influence of disturbances to one or 
more functions for reasons that can be external or inte nal to the system. The possibility 
of one or more combinations of both external and internal disturbances, ranging from 
those that occur essentially simultaneously to those that occur at different times but in 
ways that the effects of the disturbances combine, are also considered. 
The present goal of this study is to understand how the interactions of systems 
components, control and combine to affect performance, and the potential for accidents 
and failures; thus, how simple but unforeseen chains of events might combine to affect 




dam that will be modelled include the spillway gates, low level turbine intake sluices, 
gate hoists, SCADA system reliability and human operator influences. 
 
1.6.2 THESIS OUTLINE 
The dissertation goes through a natural progression, fr m background to high-level 
dynamic Simulation model building and operation. The Systems-based reliability 
modeling concepts are reviewed, and the Lower Mattag mi River case study is used s to 
demonstrate the model-building methodology and analysis using a real system that 
include dynamic risk modeling and reliability analysis.  
More specifically, Chapter 3-6 takes on the Systems modeling approach to dam safety 
performance analysis by applying the systems modeling framework to Ontario Power 
Generation’s cascade of four dams in the Lower Mattag mi Basin (Northern Ontario, 
Canada). The literature review talks about the system  approach to dam safety modeling 
from a more global perspective without delving into the technicalities of the systems 
modeling approach from inception through completion. Chapters 3-6 also delves more 
into the details of the systems modeling framework and concepts. Chapter 3 introduces 
the Lower Mattagami case study. The first two part provides a review of the two major 
theoretical foundations upon which this work builds, namely: Systems Engineering 
concepts and Reliability of Reliability analysis. The second part talks about the Project on 
which this paper is predicated on; which is Ontario Power Generations Lower Mattagami 





CHAPTER 2: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPLICATION TO SPILLWAY 
SYSTEMS  
Systems engineering is a methodical, disciplined approach for the design, realization, 
technical management, operations, and retirement of a system (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration NASA, 2007). A “system” is a construct or collection of different 
elements that together produce results not obtainable by the elements alone. The 
elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and 
documents; that is, all things required to produce system-level results.  
Dams are engineered systems that are set in a natural environment, as such, the dam sys-
tem comprising the dam and appurtenant structures, reservoir, foundations, abutments 
etc. is an engineering altered natural system. They are not merely a collection of 
components but complexes of interacting parts, subject to a variety of disturbances, and 
operated by human agency(Baecher, 2014). This chapter tackles the systems engineering 
viewpoint of the analysis of risk and reliability in hydropower dams. Hierarchical models 
of the complex system and the key building blocks from which it is constituted are 
analyzed using systems engineering approaches to problem solving. Within this 
framework, use case diagrams, requirements diagrams, context diagrams and activity 
definition diagrams will be presented for the proposed analysis approach. Other higher 
level diagrams such as block definition diagrams are outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
2.1   SYSTEM BOUNDARIES: THE CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
An important communications tool available to the systems engineer is the context 
diagram. This tool effectively displays the external entities and their interactions with the 




diagram is known as a black box diagram in that the system is represented by a single 
geographic figure in the center, without any detail. Internal composition or functionality 
is hidden. The diagram consists of three components: 
1. External Entities: These constitute all entities in which the system will interact. 
Many of these entities can be considered as sources for inputs into the system and 
destinations of outputs from the system. 
2. Interactions: These represent the interactions between the external entities and the 
system and are represented by arrows. Arrowheads repres nt the direction or flow of a 
particular interaction. While double - headed arrows are allowed, single - headed arrows 
communicate clearer information to the reader. Thus, the engineer should be careful 
when using two - directional interactions — make sure the meanings of your interactions 
are clear. Regardless, each interaction (arrow) is labeled to identify what is being passed 
across the interface. 
3. The System. This is the single geographic figure mentioned already. Typically, this is 
an oval, circle, or rectangle in the middle of the figure with only the name of the system 
within. No other information should be present. 
2.2   STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
The Spillway Systems Reliability Project (SSRP) is a multi-year effort to develop a “new 
approach” to analyzing and understanding flow control in dam systems operations by a 
consortium of hydro-power operators. The consortium s made up of British Columbia 
Hydro, Ontario Power Generation, Vattenfall and Ontario Power Generation. Ontario 




are currently applying the systems simulation methodol gy to their cascade of four dams 
in the Lower Mattagami River Basin in Northern Ontario. Other stakeholders include 
dam owners and general and risk analysts in the dam safety industry. 
 
2.3   CONTEXT DIAGRAM: SPILLWAY SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The context diagram of the proposed systems reliability approach shows at a higher level 
of abstraction, the external entities interacting with the proposed system against a 
backdrop of certain constraints. It explains the boundary inputs, outputs, constraints and 
enablers for the spillway reliability analysis system at a higher level. 
The clear definition of the boundary is important because those elements within the 
boundary are presumably under the direct control of the engineers and operators, and 
become elements of a systems model. Modeling the systems reliability of flow-control 
functions in a modern dam involves (1) characterizing the performance of a spectrum of 
systems components, (2) following the dynamic interaction of these components through 
time, and (3) tracking the possible occurrence of external disturbances to the system that 
may perturb component performance. The constraints include factors at the management 
or policy level, government regulations and technical constraints of system components.   
The inflows include a random time series of reservoir inflows from which the 
performance of the flow-control system can be modelle , reliability data for assessing 
how certain components react to varying load demands, statistical data required for a 
complete reliability analysis of components and thephysical parameters of the dam 
system. The outputs are the statistical data generated from the simulation which can be 




elevation graphs, reliability data plots etc. Reliabi ty Data comprises all system 
performance related data that can be used to estimate reliability parameters such as Mean 
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2.4   REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
Requirements engineering (RE) lies at the heart of systems development, bridging the 
gap between stakeholder goals and constraints, and their realization in systems that 
inevitably combine technology and human processes, embedded in a changing 
organizational context (Maté, 2005). RE is therefor multi-disciplinary in both its outlook 
and its deployment of techniques for elicitation, specification, analysis, and management 
of requirements. 
Requirements engineering (RE) provides the methods, t ols, and techniques to build the 
roadmaps that designers and developers of complex software/people systems should 
follow, as it is the discipline concerned with the real-world goals for, functions of, and 
constraints on those systems (Zave, 1997).  
 
2.4.1 SYSTEM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSED ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
The system-level requirements are general in nature, while requirements at low levels in 
the hierarchy are very specific. The top-level system requirements defined in the system 
requirements at this level are the main input for the requirements allocation and flow-
down phase. Three categories were defined at the systems level i.e., the Functional, 
Performance and User Requirements. The functional requi ements delineates the 
computational and modeling aspects of what our proposed system needs to achieve. The 
Performance requirements delineate what is required of the analysis system being 
designed. Basically, this centers on the capabilities of the software platform needed to 
implement the proposed analysis concept. The user requirements are generally at a higher 




requirements. Thus, they address at a higher level of abstraction what the user expects to 
be able to do with the system. Contained in the requi ments overview snapshot in figure 
2b are the user requirements of the proposed systems analysis framework as prescribed 
by the stakeholders. Bearing in mind that the proposed systems approach must consider 
all the physical and functional interrelationships among the parts of the dam and 
reservoir, and to combine the analysis of the parts in their functional and spatial 
interrelationships in a unified structure; the requirements were identified and broken 
down to a level that captures all the salient aspect  of the system.  
 
 






2.4.2   ALLOCATION AND FLOW-DOWN PROCESS 
The requirements allocation and flow-down process’ purpose is to make sure that all 
system requirements are fulfilled by a subsystem or by a set of subsystems collaborating 
together. Top-level system requirements were organized hierarchically, helping to view 
and manage information at different levels of abstraction. The requirements are 
decomposed down to the level at which the requirement can be designed and tested. The 
systems approach attempts to consider all the physical and functional interrelation-ships 
among the parts of the dam and reservoir, and to combine the analysis of the parts in their 
functional and spatial interrelationships in a unified structure. Both performance 
requirements and functional requirements are broken down to a third level of abstraction. 
Table 2a shows the decomposition of the functional, performance and user requirements. 
All other decomposition diagrams can be found in the appendix.  
Requirements List 
# Id Name Text 
1   SPILLWAY SYSTEMS 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS  
SPILLWAY SYSTEMS RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS  
2 1 FUNCTIONAL   
3 1.1 Hydrological modeling and 
flow routing 
the system shall calculate the hydrological 
modeling of data.  
4 1.1.1 read data The system shall read data on river basin 
hydrology 
5 1.1.2 read data  The system shall read hydrological inflow time 
series data from a database 
6 1.1.3 calculate The system shall calculate the downstream 
outflow rate from the dam system 
7 1.2  Hydrodynamics of flow The system shall compute data for 




8 1.2.1 storage capacity data The system shall read data on storage capacity 
parameters of the reservoir from a database 
9 1.2.2 read data on turbine sluice The system shall read data on turbine sluice unit 
rating tables for power generation demand 
10 1.2.3 read data  The system shall read data on reservoir inflow 
routing 
11 1.2.4 compute spillway flow  The system shall compute the spillway flow 
profile 
12 1.2.5 height variation computation The system shall compute the height variations 
of the reservoir 
13 1.3 Operational aspects of the dam 
system 
the system shall compute data on operational 
aspects of dam. 
14 1.3.1 operator failure rate The system shall read d ta on operator failure 
rates from human error probability database 
15 1.3.2 human effects The system shall model human effects of 
operational aspects of the dam 
16 1.4 Inherent disturbances   
17 1.4.1 rare event simulation The system shall perform "rare event" 
simulations. 
18 1.4.2 disturbance effect The system shall compute disturbance effects on 
the system components  
19 1.4.3 simulation type The system shall model inherent disturbances  
via a probabilistic framework. 
20 1.4.4   The system shall model potential violatins 
21 1.5 Failure modes and impact 
analysis 
The system shall perform computation on 
failure modes of the spill way system. 
22 1.5.1 evaluate failure of gates The system shall ev uate failure of the gates in 
the dam system 
23 1.5.2 time of failure The system shall identify me of failures  
24 1.5.3 Duration of down time The system shall identify duration of component 
down time. 
25 1.5.4 Compute MTTF The system shall compute Mean Time to Failure 
(MTTF) of components 
26 1.5.5 compute MTBF The system shall compute Mean Time Between 
Failure (MTBF) of components. 
27 1.5.6 compute failure rates The system shall compute failure rates of 
components. 
28 1.5.7 compute plots The system shall compute survival function 




29 1.5.8 read data on failure The system shall readinput data on component 
failure statistics from a database 
30 1.5.9 inherent availability of 
spillway gates 
The system shall calculate the inherent 
availability of the spillway gates 
31 1.5.10   The system shall read input data on repair times 
for non-catastrophic failures. 
32 2 PERFORMANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
  
33 2.1  requirements   
34 2.1.3 interaction variables The system shall model interactions between 
<TBD> variables 
35 2.1.4 The system shall run the time 
series model in <TBD> time 
units 
  
36 2.1.5 variable time steps The system shall have v riable time steps 
37 2.1.6 analysis time The system shall perform theanalysis in 
<TBD> hours/minutes 
38 2.1.7   computers The system shall run on personal  computers. 
39 2.1.8  nest time steps The system shall have the ability to nest the 
time steps to set the duration for result 
generation 
40 3 USER REQUIREMENTS   
41 3.1 use data The system shall allow the user to da a mine 
outputs. 
42 3.2 model The system shall enable the user to model the 
physical aspects of the dam system.  
43 3.3 incorporate data The system shall allow the us r to incorporate 
data into the analysis. 
 
2.5   USE CASE DIAGRAMS 
Use case diagrams model the functionality of the system as perceived by outside users. A 




and the system (Maté, 2005). Thus use case diagrams allow us to elicit and describe 
functional requirements. Use cases are alike in that they all describe to some degree the 
series of actions and events the system and users perform during operation; however, they 
are different in their focus and usage. The subsequent sections describe use cases for the 
proposed approach to modeling risk and reliability in dam safety. 
 
2.5.1   SYSTEMS LEVEL USE CASE 
The use case describes what the risk analyst does at a higher level of abstraction. As 
illustrated in figure 2c, the user first builds the model, tunes it and then runs it. Once the 
simulation run is complete, the Risk analyst can then choose to view the results and share 
the outputs of the simulation study with the management. Management also provides the 





Figure 3: System Level Use Case Diagram 
 
2.5.2   BUILD  MODE USE CASE 
The model should keep track of the current state of the system, including steady-state 
water levels in the reservoir and hydrological inflows into the reservoir, the current 
discharge and the state of all components in the wat r ys. In addition limitations on 
operation due to scheduled maintenance and unplanned outages, electrical and 
mechanical equipment malfunction and human errors will also be incorporated. The 
modeling will also have to take into account other equipment malfunctions of mechanical 
or electrical or structural origin and disturbances from the power system itself. From a 
mathematical view, the system that we attempt to simulate has mathematical properties 




them. The mathematical expressions which describe the system component contain 
parameters, the realized values of which are the system states at any one moment in time. 
All the data required to accurately characterize and mathematically model the system 
components are made readily available in the Data Base. These Data include 
Hydrological inflow data, Human operator error (Human error probabilities) data, 
spillway degradation data (Fragility curves), rare even probabilities, component 
reliability data etc. Figure 2d displays the proposed “build model” phase in the context of 
a use case.  
 
 Figure 4: Build Model Use Case Diagram 
 
2.5.3   RUN MODEL USE CASE 
This use case displays what’s going on behind the scenes while the simulation is running. 




using the pre-defined mathematical functions, variable and expressions. Each sub-system 
component is abstracted in mathematical expressions that describe the behavior of the 
component for a given input and given set of disturbances, and specifies the output 
interactions of the component with other components. For example, the model will 
therefore compute the relevant hydraulic parameters with respect to the established 
constraints and feed the results of these computations o other components that reference 
it in their functional expressions.  Once the simulation run ends, results are generated and 
the user can view and export the results.  
                                            






2.6 ACTIVITY DIAGRAMS                                                                                                             
Activity diagrams are a type of behavioral diagrams in the form of flowcharts of activities 
within a portion of the system showing control flows between activities (Kossiakoff, 
2011). They represent any type of flow inherent in a system, including processes, 
operations, or control the sequence of activities and events is regulated via various 
control nodes. 
 
2.6.1   ANALYST ACTIVITY DIAGRAM  
The activity diagram in figure 2f shows the complete set of activities happening in a 
success scenario. The user inputs the data and builds the model depending on the values 
defined. The user then tunes the model depending on the analysis required as mentioned 
in the diagram. After selecting a value for each of the parameters the user runs the 
analysis model which performs different computations a d calculation depending on user 
inputs. Once the system completes the intended analysis, required results are obtained. 
Once the results are ready they can be viewed, delete  or stored for further analysis. For 




                                                         
Figure 6: Risk Analyst Activity Diagram 
 
2.6.3   SIMULATION ACTIVITY DIAGRAM  
Within the simulation three process flows are tracked:  water (i.e., the physical flows), 
communication (i.e., information flows), and control (i.e., human action flows).  The 
activity diagram in figure 2f shows how the simulation proceeds in a sequential manner 
capturing the three processes described. Once the simulation run is started, flows are 
generated and routed through the reservoir. The resrvoir responds through changes in 
elevation. The operators ad automated systems communicate this changes in elevation to 
the spillway gates if its demand is needed. If its demand is needed the spillway gates are 
opened either remotely, on site or by automated systems to route water out of the 
 
reservoir. This set of event happen iteratively through time and their performance and 
reliabilities are computed befo
 





re and provided as outputs at the end of the simulation run.
 
 




CHAPTER 3: LOWER MATTAGAMI RIVER BASIN CASE STUDY 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
The Lower Mattagami River Hydroelectric (LMR) Complex is comprised of four 
hydroelectric generating plants, Smoky Falls Generation Station (GS), Little Long GS, 
Harmon GS and Kipling GS. These facilities are located in the Moose River Basin about 
90 km north of the Town of Kapuskasing, Ontario, Canada and are owned and operated 
by Ontario Power Generation (OPG).Together, these four stations are known as the 
Lower Mattagami River Hydroelectric Complex (LMR Complex). They are owned and 
operated by Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Proponent of the Project. Smoky Falls 
GS is a base load station with four vertical Francis type units and a capacity of 52 MW. 
Little Long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS each have two fixed-blade propeller type 
units and operate as peaking stations with station capacities of 136 MW, 140 MW and 
156 MW respectively. Smoky Falls GS was the first GS to come in service in 1931 while 




The Mattagami River is located in the Moose River Basin (Shown in Figure 3) in 
northeastern Ontario which encompasses a drainage area of 109,000 km2. It flows in a 
northerly direction from its headwaters at Mesomikenda. Lake and is approximately 418 
km long, covering a drainage basin area of 35,612 km2. The Mattagami River is 
generally a shallow and slow-flowing river with a sea onal flow regime, characteristic of 




as recorded by OPG is approximately 412 m3/s, based on a period of record from 1926 to 
2005. Since OPG’s hydroelectric stations along the LMR are in close succession, 
intermediate drainage areas are small and the contribution from inflows between the 
stations is not important for planning purposes. 
The LMR Complex borders two physiographic regions: the Canadian Shield which 
extends from the south to just north of Kipling GS and, beyond this, the Hudson Bay 
Lowlands. Vegetation communities in the region are typical of the Northern Clay Belt 
and Hudson Bay Lowlands sections of the Boreal Forest. The Mattagami River supports a 





Figure 8: Map of Moose River Basin 
 
3.1.2 GENERATING STATIONS 
The four GSs (Little Long, Smoky Falls, Harmon and Kipling) are located on the 
Mattagami River between 60 and 100 km north of Kapuskasing (Figure 3). The stations 
are accessible by road from either Kapuskasing or Smooth Rock Falls. From 
Kapuskasing, access to the OPG GSs is via a 93 km long series of roads consisting of the 
Fred Flatt Road, the Smoky Line Road and the Smoky Falls Road. The Fred Flatt Road is 
a 51 km long, two-lane gravel road leased by Tembec Inc. The road is open to the public 




Line Road is a 42 km long, single-lane gravel road wned by OPG. The Smoky Falls 
Road is an 18 km long, two-lane gravel road, also owned by OPG. 
Highway 643 (formerly Highway 807) links Smooth Rock Falls to Fraserdale via a 73 km 
long two-lane paved road. The 46 km Little Long Road (Fraserdale Road) is a two-lane 
gravel road that extends from Fraserdale to Little Long GS where it crosses the Little 
Long dam and links up with the Smoky Falls Road. The Little Long road is owned and 
maintained by OPG. 
3.1.3 STATION CHARACTERISTICS 
The area layout of the four GSs is shown in Figure 5. The Little Long, Harmon and 
Kipling GSs were all constructed in the early 1960s and have similar operating heads, 
hydraulic capacity and output. The GSs each have two units of the fixed-blade propeller 
type and are operated in a peaking mode. Station capacities at Little Long GS, Harmon 
GS and Kipling GS are 136, 140 and 156 MW, respectiv ly. In contrast, Smoky Falls GS 
is a 4-unit baseload station operating effectively 24 h/d with a station capacity of 52 MW. 
Transmission of electrical energy from the four stations is provided by a 230 kV 
transmission line from Kipling GS via Harmon GS to Little Long GS substation and from 
there to the Pinard transformer station near Fraserd l . Generation from the existing 
Smoky Falls GS is fed into a 115 kV transmission line that runs directly to the Tembec 
paper mill in Kapuskasing.  Relevant characteristics for each GS as well as the nearby 





Figure 9: Characteristics of LMR Complex Stations 
 
Figure 10:  Characteristics of LMR Complex Stations 
Notes: Turbine capacity at maximum continuous rating (MCR) at average head (as provided by OPG). 
Average annual energy divided by capacity. 
Includes recent turbine upgrades.  
Combined spill capacity is 6087 m3/s. Maximum daily recorded flow at Little Long GS is 5070 m3/s. 










3.2 GENERATING STATIONS 
Several hydroelectric generating stations were built in the Moose River Basin during the 
twentieth century. The four largest stations, known as the Lower Mattagami River (LMR) 
Complex are located on the Mattagami River about 90 km north of the Town of 
Kapuskasing. Smoky Falls GS was approved in 1923 and co structed between 1927 and 
1931 by Spruce Falls Power and Paper Company (SFPP). In late 1989, Ontario Hydro 
purchased the plant from SFPP and through its succesor OPG, has operated the facility 
to the between 1963 and 1966 and are owned and operated by OPG. 
3.2.1 LITTLE LONG GS 
Little Long GS has concrete and earth-fill water retaining structures that maintain the 
integrity of the Little Long reservoir, which is the main storage facility for the four 
generating stations. The reservoir extends about 45 km upstream, has a surface area of 
about 76 km2 and provides a live storage volume of 162 x 106 m3 at a maximum 
drawdown of 3.02 m. The powerhouse originally provided a maximum power flow of 
536 m3/s at a head of about 28 m, through two identcal vertical fixed blade turbine units 
each with nominal installed capacity of approximately 61 MW. 
The runner blades for the units have been adjusted to give a higher discharge of 583 m3/s 
and output of approximately 68 MW. 
When river flows exceed the 583 m3/s maximum power flow of the Little Long GS, the 
Adam Creek spillway structure, located approximately 2.5 km east of the GS, is used to 
pass excess water into Adam Creek. The Adam Creek spillway structure consists of eight 
sluices with a total capacity of approximately 4870 m3/s at reservoir elevation 198.12 m. 




Mattagami River about 17 km downstream of the Kipling GS. A secondary spillway 
structure constructed in the former Mattagami River channel just west of the Little Long 
GS powerhouse has a capacity of 1217 m3/s, and provides for diversion flow to the 
downstream GSs in case of shutdown of the Little Long GS units and to augment the 
Adam Creek spilling capacity. 




3.2.2 SMOKY FALLS GS 
Smoky Falls GS has a concrete dam (west dam) that incorporates the intakes for the 
powerhouse, a spillway structure to bypass flows in the event of a sudden unit outage, 
and an earth-fill retaining structure (east dam) located near the spillway. The headpond 




extends upstream for about 7 km, has a surface area of about 5.3 km2 and a live storage 
volume of 6.7 x 106 m3 at a maximum drawdown of 3.05 m. The powerhouse contains 
four vertical Francis type turbine units, with the capacity to generate 52 MW at a rated 
flow of approximately 190 m3/s and an operating head of 34.5 m. The existing spillway 
structure consists of 10 gated sluices, each being 8.4 m wide by 9.2 m high, plus an 
approximately 230 m long overflow crest. The spillway structure was originally designed 
(prior to the construction of the Adam Creek Diversion) to convey what was then the full 
design flood flow on the Mattagami River. With the construction of the Adam Creek 
Diversion, the spillway only needs to maintain a discharge capacity of 1217 m3/s. Two of 





     
Figure 15: Smokey Falls Generating Stations 
 
3.2.3 HARMON GS 




Harmon GS has a single concrete dam that incorporates the intakes for the power station 
and a spillway to bypass flows in the event of a plnt outage. The headpond extends 









The powerhouse contains two identical vertical fixed blade turbine units with an installed 
capacity of 70 MW each. The operating head is approximately 31 m and the rated flow is 
525 m3/s. 
Figure 17: Harmon Spillway Gates 
 




3.2.4 KIPLING GS 
Kipling GS has a single concrete dam incorporating he intake structure and spillway. 
The headpond at Kipling GS is about 5.6 km long. It has a surface area of about 1.2 km2, 








operates at 0.5 m lower generating head. Each of the two turbine units generates at 78 
MW. The two units had a runner upgrade in 2002 (Unit #2) and 2005 (Unit #1). 
 
 
Figure 19: Kipling Generating Stations 






3.3 LOWER MATTAGAMI RIVER (LMR) COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODELING 
Modeling of river systems for simulation purposes ha  a very long tradition in the water 
management and environmental management areas. A watershed or a catchment has 
always been in the center of modeling attention due to its complexity in responding to 
external and internal inputs. The Mattagami River is a river in the James Bay drainage 
basin in Cochrane District, Timiskaming District and Sudbury District in Northeastern 
Ontario, Canada. The Mattagami flows 443 kilometers (275 mi) from its source at 
Mattagami Lake in geographic Gouin Township in the Unorganized North Part of 
Sudbury District, on the Canadian Shield southwest of Timmins, to Portage Island in 
geographic Gardiner Township in the Unorganized North Part of Cochrane District, in 
the Hudson Bay Lowlands. 
The Lower Mattagami Hydroelectric Complex is made up of four generating stations on 
the Mattagami River. The four stations are (from south to north): Little Long, Smoky 
Falls, Harmon, and Kipling. They are about 70 kilometers northeast of Kapuskasing and 
about 150 kilometers upstream of Moose Factory and the Town of Moosonee. Little Long 
dam is the first dam in the series of four cascades and intercepts about ninety per cent of 
the run-off from the Mattagami River watershed, which s them channeled to the Little 
Long generating station.  
The number of riparians in the river flood plain is few and there is no commercial 
riverine navigation, so potential loss of life is small or negligible and operational safety 
dominates. Upstream of Little Long dam is a seasonally-v rying inflow and a reservoir. 
The remaining three dams downstream (Smokey Falls, Harmon, and Kipling) have little 
storage capacity. Each dam has two vertical lift gates and all four structures have 
 
 
approximately the same spillway capa
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north of the Town of Kapuskasing, Ontario, and are owned and operated by Ontario 
Power Generation Inc.(OPG). 
Smoky Falls GS has a capacity of 52 MW. Little Long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS 
operate as peaking stations with station capacities of 136 MW, 140 MW and 156 MW 
respectively. Smoky Falls GS was the first to come in service in 1931 while Little Long 
GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS all came into service between 1963 and 1966. Little 
Long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling Gs will get additional generating unit, each. Smoky 
Falls GS is primed to get an entirely new powerhouse with 3 units. Thus the whole 
cascade will have 3 turbines at each station with approximately same discharge 
capacities. Little long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS are also primed to have an extra 
new unit each. 
Anticipated times of new equipment going into service are: 
Generation Station Number of Units New Unit Installation Date 
Little Long  1 Mar-14 
Smoky Falls  3 Sep-14 
Harmon  1 2015 
Kipling  1 2015 
Table 6: Projected Power Generation Station Expansion for LMR Complex 
New unit at Little Long GS - March 2014 Smoky Falls GS - 1st unit September 2014, 
other two units 2 and 4 months later Harmon GS 1 new unit – 2015 Kipling GS 1 new 




Figure 22: LMR Complex Size Parameters 
 
3.3.2   Existing GENERATING STATIONS 
Smoky Falls GS is smaller than the other three stations and as a result is required to pass 
water without generating electricity. OPG would like to replace the existing powerhouse 
at Smoky Falls GS with a new one with a capacity of 264 MW (270 MW installed turbine 
capacity) that could use all of the available water efficiently. New manmade structures 
such as an approach channel, intake and tailrace would also be constructed. The old dams 
and spillways for the station would remain. OPG is also proposing to add a third unit to 
Little Long GS, Harmon GS, and Kipling GS increasing stalled capacity to 200, 235 
and 235 MW respectively for a total of approximately 450 MW of additional Power. 
 




3.4.1   CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE LOWER MATTAGAMI RIVER CASE STUDY 
Applying the proposed systems modeling concept to OPG’s Lower Mattagami System to 
better understand the systems interactions in their cascade of four dams; this involves 
dams at Smoky Falls, Little Long, Harmon and Kipling. All four dams are primed for 
upgrades to their Power Generation capacities within t e next 2 years. The core 
objectives of the project are listed below: 
• Applying the systems modeling framework developed in the SSRP to OPG’s 
Lower Mattagami System to better understand the systems interactions in their 
cascade of four dams; this involves dams at Smoky Falls, Little Long, Harmon 
and Kipling.  
• Formulating and constructing a model to accurately characterize the physics of 
hydrodynamics including the dynamics of transport, Storage and power 
generation. Holistically integrating into the model, river basin hydrology, the 
routing of inflows through the reservoir system, operating rules and human factors 
of operating the spillway, and the dam component fragilities (structural, 
mechanical and electrical). 
• Generate stochastic time series by using the historic inflow time series to forecast 
inflows for several thousand years and multiple replications to identify unforeseen 
chain of events that could lead to dam system failure. 
• Reviewing the current operating rules to determine wh ther further optimization 





• Modeling the inherent disturbances (Lightening, Seismic, Floating Ice, Grid 
disturbances and Debris) via a probabilistic framework. 
• Incorporating Human reliability analysis (HRA) into he model by using expert 
judgment and available data to estimate human error pr babilities on spillway 
gate operations with regards to failure. 
 
3.4.2   FEATURES 
The modeling activities allow different conceptual pproaches to be analyzed and 
compared. The level of modeling in this report is kept at the more general ‘logical’ level 
and is a means of exploring how BC Hydro’s interests can be met. It would be possible to 
develop a more detailed ‘physical’ model referring to specific equipment selections but 
such detail is not justified until the logical modeling has allowed the main system 
configurations to be explored. 
 
3.5   VIEWPOINTS 
The main viewpoints of interest for the LMR complex systems modeling are: 
a. Safety (a mandatory consideration for a safety assessment); 
b. Reliability (includes surveillance, the assurance of reliability by routine inspection and 
testing); 





3.6   MAJOR RISKS IDENTIFIED RISKS 
The main risks to the safe operation of the dam can be summarized as: 
a. The loss of remote control through communications r other failure; 
b. Incorrect management decisions, for any reason, that fail to establish the appropriate 
spill profile for the prevailing conditions; 
c. The loss of power supplies or other supporting or auxiliary services; 
d. The loss of access to the dam in emergency; 
e. Unpredictable and excessive weather; 
f. Common cause disruption such as fire; 
g. Failure of control or instrumentation; 
h. A lack of qualified personnel to provide an emergency response; 
i. Failure of the gates or supporting structures. 
3.7 SYSTEMS AND STUDY BOUNDARIES 
The full boundary of the Mattagami River System is presented in the appendix. A 
snapshot of the system schematic is provided in figure 19. This shows the Lower 
Mattagami cascade of four dams from Little Long to Kipling with an overview of their 
Power output capacities, discharge capacities of spillway gates and the power generating 
turbines and operating ranges. Figure 21 shows the ystem boundary of this case study, 




For the purpose of this study, this work only covers Lower Mattagami cascade of four 
dams as shown in the general arrangements drawing in fi ure 21. Based on the defined 
boundary, the case study concentrates on: 
a. The routing of water through the entire system from Little Long to Kipling; 
b. Power Supplies (The generation of power at all fourgeneration stations); 
c. The operation of the Spillway gates  
d. The spillway gate controls, drives and hoists and their inherent fragilities 
e. Spillway operations, both local and remote; 
 





Figure 24: Power and Discharge Outputs 
 




3.8 GOLDSIM™ MODELING FRAMEWORK  
3.8.1 BACKGROUND TO GOLDSIM™ AND THE RELIABILITY MODULE 
For many engineered systems, it is necessary to predict measures such as the system's 
reliability (the probability that a component or system will perform its required function 
over a specified time period) and availability (the probability that a component or system 
is performing its required function at any given time). 
By combining the flexibility of a general-purpose and highly-graphical probabilistic 
simulation framework that can directly model the movement of material through a 
system, with specialized features to support reliability analysis and optimization, 
GoldSim™ allows you to create quantitative and transparent liability and throughput 
models to allow you to ask "what if" questions regarding various designs and make 
defensible risk management decisions. GoldSim™ is most valuable when analyzing 
complex systems with many subsystems. 
GoldSim™ can be thought of as a high-level programming langu ge, where the program 
is the model. The analyst joins together objects called “elements” using “links” to create 
the model of the system. Elements, which may represnt either physical or logical 
components of the system, will often have a stochastic component, and the links carry 
information between the elements. 
Realistic analysis of such systems is best facilitated by a “total system” model that 
represents the interactions, interdependencies and feedback between the various system 
components (including humans). Without such a model, it may not be possible to identify 




The modeler creates a representation of the system in its initial state, imbuing the 
elements with the appropriate properties, behaviors, and relationships. Then, when the 
simulation is started, the software takes over and evaluates the entire history of the 
system, saving selected results for subsequent analysis. 
3.8.2 THE RELIABILITY MODULE 
The reliability module is an add-on to the standard GoldSim™ simulation framework, 
consisting of two new element types: the Function elem nt and the Action element. The 
Function element is used to model components that perform their function over a period 
of time (e.g., a battery or an environmental control system), while Action elements are 
used to model components that perform their duties only when triggered by a specific 
condition or conditions (e.g., a relay, or an actuator). The primary output of a reliability 
element is its operating state at any given time during the simulation: whether it is 
operating or not. 
3.9   WHY GOLDSIM™? 
GoldSim™ is a Monte Carlo simulation software solution for dynamically modeling 
complex systems in business, engineering and science. GoldSim™ supports decision and 
risk analysis by simulating future performance while quantitatively representing the 
uncertainty and risks inherent in all complex systems. 
The GoldSim™ software is highly graphical and extensible, able to quantitatively 
represent the uncertainty inherent in complex system , and allows users to create 
compelling models that are easy to communicate and explain to diverse audiences. Users 
build a model in an intuitive manner by literally drawing a picture (an influence diagram) 




graphically create and manipulate data and equations. It moves beyond spreadsheets, 
however, by making it much easier for users to evaluate how systems evolve over time 
and predict their future behavior. 
Water resources and hydrological modeling projects typically involve simulating systems 
made up of many component parts that are interrelated. In most situations, the 
hydrological system is driven by stochastic variables (i.e., runoff, precipitation, 
evaporation, demand) and involves uncertain processes, parameters, and events. The 
challenge when evaluating water supply and resource systems is to find an approach that 
can incorporate all the knowledge available into a qu ntitative framework that can be 
used to simulate and predict the outcome of alternaive pproaches and policies. 
By combining the flexibility of a general-purpose and highly-graphical probabilistic 
simulation framework with specialized modules to support mass transport modeling, 
reliability analysis, and optimization, GoldSim™ simulation software is optimized to 
create realistic models of water supply, water resource, hydraulic and hydrological 
systems in order to carry out risk analyses, evaluate potential environmental impacts, 





4.   HYDROLOGIC MODELING AND FLOW ROUTING 
There is no single and unique definition of a river system and the definitions may change 
depending on the purpose of the study of the system b ing undertaken. According to 
Dunne (2009), “River systems are complex systems through which irregular fluxes of 
water and mobile terrestrial materials derived from the lithosphere, atmosphere, 
biosphere, and techno-sphere are focused.” 
What is of interest in applications of systems approach to regulated river networks are the 
models of river systems. A model is only a physical or mathematical representation of the 
system itself and of the interrelations and interactions between the system elements. As 
such the models are only simplified and idealized abstr ctions of reality and usually do 
not describe the entire modelled reality. But it should be noted that this should not 
necessarily disqualify the model since the purpose of the modeling activity can be often 
characterized as achieving only prescribed accuracy within the predefined time and 
budget constraints (Baecher, 2014) 
A definition of a river system model in this paper can be developed along the following 
general principles: 
• A system can be defined as a collection of interrelated elements purposely working 
toward achieving some common objective;   
• Most of the natural systems or systems that include natural systems can be characterized 




• The elements of the system can be subdivided into the following three groups: 
components, attributes and relationships. These thre distinctive groups can be 
characterized as: 
• Components or subsystems are the operating parts of a system and consist of input, 
process and output. Components can take the form of natural or technological artefacts. 
Each component may assume a variety of values defining the system state; 
•   Attributes are the properties or discernible manifestations of the system, its 
components and the relationships between them; 
• Relationships are the links between components and attributes. The properties and 
behavior of each component of the system influence the properties and behavior of the 
system as a whole. At the same time, each component depends up-on the properties and 
behavior of at least one other component in the system. Because of this interdependence, 
the components cannot be divided into independent subsets; the system is more than the 
sum of its parts. Also, if a component is removed from a system or if its characteristics 
change, the other artefacts in the system will alter characteristics accordingly, and the 
relationships among them may also change (Carlsson, 2002). 
• River networks whether in natural state or regulated (with human-made structures) can 
thus be understood as systems; 
• Behavior of the river system can be characterized by quantities that vary in time (water 
levels, flows, velocities at different places within the system, etc.); 




-  Reservoirs providing storage behind the dams; 
-  Natural and artificial channels; 
-  Diversion and control structures (dams); 
-  Confluence points; 
-  Local sub-basins (sub-watersheds). 
It is important to understand at this point that such a definition of the model of a river 
system is not universal and may be inadequate for purposes that differ from the purpose 
of this paper. The Mattagami River System-on which this paper is predicated- includes 
dams, and thus the system is a regulated river system and the purpose of the regulation is 
to satisfy the needs of various water uses. These uses include hydropower generation, 
navigation support, flood control etc.  
 
4.1 HISTORIC TIME SERIES DATA 
50 year historic time series data on reservoir inflows from the lower Mattagami to Little 
Long will be used to generate Stochastic Reservoir Inflows through time series 
forecasting. The complexity of the time series forecasting is not at the highest level since 
the emphasis on this thesis is on promulgating the systems concept and not necessarily 
achieving accurate time series models. The method adopted for forecasting the local 




• In this particular case study, as already explained th  emphasis is not on the accuracy of 
time series forecasting techniques and hence the historic data (Inflow time series) was 
used to populate a forward looking Time Series.   
• Having established that, the next step was to apply that historic data to the simulation 
(which looks forward in time). In order to do this, therefore, there was the need to time 
shift the data so that the historic data is applied in an appropriate and consistent manner. 
• How this works is, a random starting point is chosen from the historic series to 
incorporate some level of uncertainty in forwarding the historic series. This option 
randomly samples a starting point in the data set for each realization.  This is useful since 
we have 50 years of inflow data, and want GoldSim™ to randomly sample a different 
historic start year for each realization. 
• The Data periodicity is set as “annual”, which means GoldSim™ ensures that the random 
starting point for each realization is sampled such that all starting points are a multiple of 
1 (average) year apart.  In particular, random starting points for successive realizations 
are always multiples of 365.25 days apart (rounded to the nearest day). 
• This option shifts the time series data forward (or backward) by a multiple of a year such 
that the simulation begins by using data from the sp cified Data year to start in.  For 
instance, if the actual data set started on 31 July1989 and ended on 31 December 2011, 
the Simulation Start Date was 1 January 2013, and the Data year to start in was entered as 
1990, GoldSim™ would treat the data set such that the data point corresponding to 1 
January 1990 would be used for 1 January 2013 (and, assuming daily data was entered, 




• To account for uncertainty and randomness while stil directly using the historic data, the 
use of random starting point option with “annual periodicity” suits the purpose of this 
study. 
• The “Enable Time Shifting of Time Series Data” optin was chosen in the advanced 
settings in the GoldSim™ Time Series Element and GoldSim™ automatically wraps 
around to the start of the data set if the end of the data set is reached during a simulation.  
The manner in which this is done depends on the periodicity of the data. 
• By using a random starting point with annual periodicity and aligning data years with 
simulation dates, when the end of the data set is reached, the data set is effectively 
replicated and shifted forward by N years, where N is the number of whole years in the 
data set.  For example, if there were 3.5 years of data in the data set, the last data point 
was on December 31, and the simulation extended beyond 3.5 years, the data set would 
be shifted forward by 3 years, so that the first occurrence of January 1 in the data set 
would follow the last point in the data set. 
4.2 THE MODELED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC 
Figure 22 shows snapshot of the general model interfac  showcasing the salient aspects 
of the physical system being modeled. It shows representation of the system in its initial 
state, imbuing the elements with the appropriate properties, behaviors, and relationships. 
Then, when the simulation is started, the software t kes over and evaluates the entire 







Figure 26: LMR System Simulation Model Interface 
3.3 OPERATING PATTERNS AND FLOW ROUTING 
Although the four GSs are in close proximity, Smoky Falls GS was constructed over 30 
years earlier to serve a different purpose than Little Long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling 
GS. Smoky Falls GS is a 4-unit, baseload station operating effectively 24 h/d with a rated 
flow capacity of 188 m3/s. The other three stations (Little Long GS, Harmon GS and 
Kipling GS) each has two units and are peaking stations that operate depending on 
available inflows (Ontario Hydro 1990). 
In contrast to the Smoky Falls GS, the other GSs have flow capacities that range from 
525 to 585 m3/s. As a result, their combined ability to utilize available river flow for 
energy production is not optimal. As such, Smoky Falls GS is undersized and is a flow 




situation require that Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS head pond water 
levels fluctuate daily. The Smoky Falls GS headpond is rawn down approximately 3 m 
to receive the peak discharge from Little Long GS. Similarly, both the Harmon GS and 
Kipling GS headponds must be drawn down to accommodate the discharge from Smoky 
Falls GS. 
 
Figure 27: Historic Daily Inflow Statistics, Little Long GS 
Flows in the Mattagami River are highly regulated by the presence of hydropower 
generating facilities and water control structures that provide electricity generation and 
flood mitigation. 
The existing four-station LMR Complex is located approximately 80 km north of 




Kipling) each have two units and are peaking stations with flow capacities ranging from 
525 to 585 m3/s while the fourth station, Smoky Falls GS, is a 4-unit, baseload station 
operating 24 h/d with a rated flow capacity of 188 m3/s. In comparison, the existing 
Smoky Falls GS has less flow capacity for energy production. 
During the spring freshet, flows in the Mattagami River typically exceed the flow 
capacities of the GSs and therefore must be diverted through the Adam Creek Diversion. 
Adam Creek then discharges this overflow into the Mattagami River at a point 
approximately 17 km downstream of the Kipling GS (section 5.2.1.3 below). Figure 5.2-1 
presents historic daily inflows to Little Long GS headpond. When flows exceed 583 
m3/s, excess water that cannot be utilized by the Mattagami River GSs is diverted to 
Adam Creek. As shown in Figure 5.2-1, the average peak daily flows during the spring 
freshet are above 1,500 m3/s and can be quite variable. Appendix F provides the flow 
duration curves for each month and for a total year. 
 
4.4 FLOW ROUTING AT LITTLE LONG 
The current state of events requires Little Long to generate electricity at full capacity 
within its operating range. This means the turbines will be operated at maximum best 
efficiency flow until the lower operating limit at of the Little Long Reservoir is reached; 
at which point the turbine flow becomes equal to the inflow into the reservoir if inflows 
fall below the flow required for best efficiency flow. On the other hand, if inflows are 
greater than the requirements for best efficiency flow, the excess is used to fill up the 
Reservoir until its peak operating limit. In this case the excess Inflow is spilled through 




open into the Mattagami River. The two that open into the Mattagami River are only to 
be used in case the 8 gates at Adam creek are insufficient. Below is a summary of the 
operating notes from OPG for Little Long. 
4.4.1 OPERATION (LITTLE LONG) 
1. The Adam Creek Diversion bypasses the Mattagami River plants from above Little 
Long GS to below Kipling GS and is the primary floodwater route.                                   
2. Dam Safety Response Water Levels have been established in accordance with the 
requirements of Dam Safety Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) 
standards to guide operators in case of hydraulic emergency (See Table 5).   
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3. At the start of freshet, the Little Long forebay should be filled to an elevation not 
exceeding 198.00 metres.  After achieving that elevation, any inflow greater than the 
amount of water required for two-unit operation (583 m3/s) should be spilled down 
Adams Creek.   The reason for this maximum level of 198.00 metres is to allow for safe 
operation of the station in the event of a contingency that results in the loss of units and 
operating control (e.g. a lightning strike).  Such a contingency would make it impossible 
to remotely control sluice gate operation of Adams Creek.  This 12-centimeter of storage 
will allow for the four hour time lag required to dispatch operator agents to the station to 
deal with the contingency. The maximum forebay level of 198.00 meters is during the 
freshet period only. There is no requirement to spill through the main dam.  This practice 
should be avoided to improve operating efficiency at Smoky Falls during freshet.  
Another reason for avoiding this practice is to eliminate the stranding of sturgeon in the 
spillway pools and the subsequent rescue operation. The forebay should be filled 
gradually to 198.12 metres in the last seven days of freshet. 
3. Sluicegates 5, 6, 9, and 10 are controlled locally by the operator agents at the gates.    
Two to four hours may be required to reach the site. There is a concern of further 
undermining of the sluiceway apron at Adams Creek sluicegates 8 and 9.  An engineering 
assessment, which included a diving inspection, carried out in September 1996 confirmed 
that no restrictions are required on sluicegates 3 to 10 at this time.  The area is to be re-
inspected subsequent to each major spill in which sluicegates 8 and 9 are utilized.  As a 
minimum, the area of the sluiceway apron is to be inspected every three years.  The last 





4. As the differences in water levels across the trash r cks of Little Long G.S. have 
frequently been found to be excessive, these differences must be measured frequently and 
kept in moderation by clamming.  In addition to the dangers of potentially drawing air 
into the penstocks, the head losses associated with large trash rack differentials can be 
quite costly. 
 
4.5   FLOW ROUTING AT SMOKEY FALLS 
Smoky Falls GS is a baseload station with four vertical Francis type units and a capacity 
of 52 MW. The 4-unit baseload station operates effectiv ly 24 h/d with a rated flow 
capacity of 188 m3/s. In contrast to the Smoky Falls GS, the other GSs have flow 
capacities that range from 525 to 585 m3/s. As a result, their combined ability to utilize 
available river flow for energy production is not optimal. As such, Smoky Falls GS is 
undersized and is a flow “bottleneck” within the LMR Complex. 
 




4.5.1   OPERATION (SMOKEY) 
1. Several operating restrictions are required when maintenance work is being completed at 
the draft tube level under the runner at Smoky Falls GS.  During this time, the tailrace is 
limited to a maximum elevation of 135.09 m and the combined (plant plus sluicegate) 
discharge is limited to 350 m3/s.  The maximum Harmon GS headwater during this time 
period is limited to 133.40 m. 
2. The elevation of the top of the sluicegates is 170.30 m.  A 15-centimeter board has been 
added to the top of the sluicegates in order to achieve the forebay maximum elevation of 
170.45 m.  The maximum forebay elevation may have to be reduced in the fall to prevent 
water splashing over the top, thus building up ice and possibly making the sluicegates 
unavailable for remote operation. 
3. The #2 sluicegate is equipped with DC backup to operate the gate upon the loss of station 
service. 
4. During high inflow periods (freshet) when both Little Long units are generating at 
maximum gate continually, lower the Smoky Falls forebay to 168.00 meters.  The 
resulting head increase at Little Long will create  net gain of 3 or more MW including 
the lowered output at Smoky Falls. 
 
3.6   HARMON OPERATIONS 
1. Adam Creek Diversion bypasses the main river from above Little Long GS to below 
Kipling GS and is the primary and major floodwater route.  Inflows exceeding station 




2. The sluices are numbered from right to left looking upstream at the dam.  Sluice Gate 1 
opens automatically when the forebay rises above 135.33 metres (444.0 feet - CGD).  
Sluice Gate 2 opens automatically when the forebay rises above 135.48 metres (444.5 
feet - CGD).  The automatic sluice-gates are operated to avoid topping, even by wave 
action, the 135.64 metres (445.00 feet) mining reservation contour. 
Dam Safety Response Water Levels have been established in accordance with the 
requirements of Dam Safety Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP) 
standards to guide operators in case of hydraulic emergency.  The values specified in 
Table 2 should not be used indiscriminately as prevailing site specific conditions may 
differ from those assumed for their calculation.  Therefore, operators are advised to 
contact Civil Engineering Department (CED) when conditions could lead to an 
emergency, and during the course of an emergency, for consultation and advice.   
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136.24 Crest Concrete Gravity Section 
Table 6: Harmon GS Forebay Response Water Levels 
4.7   KIPLING OPERATIONS 
1. Sluice gate 1 opens automatically when forebay rises above 103.63m. Sluice Gate 2 
opens automatically when the forebay rises above 103.78m. 
2. Care must be taken in utilizing additional storage for energy emergency. Elevations 
below 100.00m are below the range of the gauge and are not to be telemetered to NECC. 
3. Adam Creek Diversion bypasses the main river from above Little Long GS to below 
Kipling GS and is the Major Floodwater route. 
 
Figure 29: Kipling GS Forebay Response Water Levels 
 
4.8 RESERVOIR OPERATIONS SUMMARY 
The water flows for the four GSs are provided from the Little Long GS reservoir. The 
water level is normally within the operating headwater level range. The extreme limit of 




the absolute maximum and maximum operating levels is referred to as the “flood 
allowance”, which is only used to hold water in extr me conditions to reduce downstream 
flooding. The storage between the absolute minimum and minimum operating levels is 
only used if a system energy emergency occurs. Under ormal operating conditions with 
equivalent discharges at each station, the full operating range in the Smoky Falls GS, 
Harmon GS and Kipling GS head ponds would rarely be utilized and headpond levels 
will be significantly more stable during operation. 
4.8.1 SUMMARY SPILLWAY OPERATIONS 
Under normal operating conditions, the outflow from the Little Long GS reservoir will 
pass through all the GSs. During any outage of a GS, the spillway at the station 
experiencing the outage will be operated to pass the desired flow to the other GSs. 
During high river flow conditions (e.g., spring runoff) when the Little Long GS reservoir 
is near its maximum limit, the spillway at Adam Creek will be operated in conjunction 
with Little Long GS to pass the full Mattagami River flow.  
 
4.9 POWER GENERATION 
The Lower Mattagami Hydroelectric Complex Project has provided peaking and baseload 
power to the Ontario grid for industrial, commercial and residential consumers since 
1963. The Little Long, Harmon and Kipling GSs were all constructed in the early 1960s 
and have similar operating heads, hydraulic capacity nd output. The GSs each have two 
units of the fixed-blade propeller type and are operated in a peaking mode. Station 




respectively. In contrast, Smoky Falls GS is a 4-unit baseload station operating 
effectively 24 h/d with a station capacity of 52 MW. 
Transmission of electrical energy from the four stations is provided by a 230 kV 
transmission line from Kipling GS via Harmon GS to Little Long GS substation and from 
there to the Pinard transformer station near Fraserd l . Generation from the existing 
Smoky Falls GS is fed into a 115 kV transmission line that runs directly to the Tembec 
paper mill in Kapuskasing. 
Parameter 
Little Long 
GS Smoky Falls GS 
Harmon 
GS Kipling GS 
No. of units 2 4 2 2 
Gross head (m) 27.9 34.4 31 31 
Station discharge capacity (m3/s) 583 188 525 585 
Station turbine capacity (MW) 136 52 140 156 
Unit capacity (MVA)/ Turbine 68 13 70 78 
Best Efficiency Rate  kW/(m3/s) 235.7 288.9 272.3 272.7 
Table 6: Estimated Turbine and Generator Characteristics 
The Little Long powerhouse provides a maximum power flow of 583 m3/s at a head of 
about 28 m, through two identical vertical fixed blade turbine units each with nominal 
installed capacity of approximately 68 MW. When rive  flows exceed the 583 m3/s 
maximum power flow of the Little Long GS, the Adam Creek spillway structure, located 
approximately 2.5 km east of the GS, is used to pass excess water into Adam Creek. The 
estimated turbine and generator characteristics for each station are shown in Table 6. 
 
5.0   THE MODEL 
As explained in Chapter 3 on time series forecasting, the historical data (Inflow time 
series) was used to populate a forward looking time Series. Additionally, since OPG’s 
hydroelectric stations along the LMR are in close succession, intermediate drainage areas 
are small and the contribution from inflows between the stations is not important for risk 
analysis purposes. With that said, an analysis of the local inflow data at Kipling was 
made to demonstrate how local basin inflows can be analyzed and incorporated into the 
systems model should local flows be deemed large enough to affect the reliable 
performance of the LMR system.  
 






5.1 RESERVOIR MODELING 
The Goldsim™ platform is used was used to model the behavior of the each of the dams at 
the four stations.  Reservoir elements are elements that accumulate flows. It was to 
accumulate and track reservoir storage at all four dams. 
The default symbol is a dam (pictured in fig. 26) and a reservoir since this is an excellent 
graphical representation for the behavior of the elm nt. Like a real reservoir, the 
reservoir element is programmed to iteratively compute its addition rate, withdrawal rate 
and other important functions. For the LMR system, ach of the 4 dams addition rate is 
computed by defining the addition rate as a functio of the reservoir inflow rate while the 
withdrawal rate is defined as a function of both the Spill through the Spillway gates and 
the Volume routed through the turbines. 
 
Figure 31: Little Long Reservoir Element 
Addition Rate=Upstream Daily flow 
Withdrawal rate=Turbine Flow + Spillway Flow 
Like an Integrator, a Reservoir requires an Initial V ue and a rate of change. 
The rate of change, however, is specified in terms of two separate inputs, an 
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The model computes the storage in the reservoir based on storage capacity tables 
provided by OPG via integration to give the reservoir elements primary output as shown 
in equation 1 above. Thus the Model is programmed to in erpolate from the storage 
capacity table to compute the volume increments and decrements and also the elevation 
increments and decrements. The purpose of this paper is not to demonstrate the 
programming that goes into the systems modeling concept and hence programming in 
GoldSim™ with respect to this case study will not be looked at in depth; the model has 
already been verified and validated. Figure 27 shows a snapshot of Little Long GS 






Figure 32: General Little Long System Model Interface 
5.2 POWER GENERATION MODELING 
Power generation at Little long GS was modeled by combining GoldSim™ elements and 
some basic programming. Unit rating tables were provided by OPG from each of the dam 
sites. The power generated by each unit is a functio  of the head of water over the sluice 
inlets and the discharge through the turbines. The Power generation function is therefore 
programmed to compute the amount of power being produced by using the Head of water 
of the turbines and the discharge through the turbines. The unit rating tables for each of 
the dams can be found in the appendix. Figure 28 show  a screenshot of the unit rating 
tables used to compute the power generation. 
In addition to the unit rating tables, best efficiency tables are recommended to be used to 





Figure 33: Little Long Unit Rating Table  
 
  
5.3 SPILLWAY GATES AND TURBINE OPERATIONS 
 As dictated by the operating rule, the dam is filled to an elevation of 198m and the 
calculated head over the turbine intake is 198-170.22=27.78m. At maximum reservoir 
operating capacity of 198.12m, max head over turbines=27.90m.  
The 12cm difference between the standard operating elevation of 198m and the 
maximum operating elevation of 198.12m is to allow f r the four hour time lag required 
to dispatch operator agents to the station to deal with the contingency.  Hence the model 
is programmed such that Little Long Reservoir fills to 198m and if the inflow into the 
reservoir exceeds what is required for best efficien y power generation as provided in the 
unit rating table, the excess inflow is routed out f the reservoir through the spillway 




operated first and if they are insufficient, the additional 2 gates that open into the 
Mattagami River will be used to supplement the spill. Currently, there is no requirement 
to spill through the main dam.  This practice is avoided to improve operating efficiency at 
Smoky Falls during freshet. 
Consequently, if the inflow into the reservoir is below what is required for best efficiency 
flow, and the reservoir elevation is at the minimum operating elevation, then same head is 
maintained while inflow water (or equivalent volume) is routed through turbine intake 
sluices. On the other hand if the inflow into the reservoir is less than the minimum for 
best efficiency flow but the reservoir elevation is above the minimum operating 
elevation, then the reservoir elevation is gradually lowered while generating the 





Figure 34: Spillway Gate Sub model Interface 
Since the documents does not describe any power genration constraints at this point in 
time, the LL dam is operated simply by following the best efficiency power generation 
values provided in the unit rating table when upstream flow is equal to or more than the 
specified discharges for best efficiency power generation. Where the inflow is more than 
the best efficiency discharges, the excess inflow is routed through the 6 spillways 
automatically controlled through the SCADA systems. The 4 manually operated gates 
have been configured as described in the operating document for LL. That is; once the 




additional 4 spillway gates if need be; meaning the manually operated gates require a 4hr 
time lag on demand. The Spillway discharges are a function of the reservoir pool 
elevation and the height of Gate opening and are interpolated from the Sluiceway rating 
tables provided by OPG. Figure 29 show the Spillway g te submodels. Each submodel 
contains further computations on reliability and availability which will be looked at in 
more detail in the latter chapters.  
 
Figure 35: Spillway gate Model Interface 
 
There are a total of 10 sluices with gates.  Two of the 10 sluices (Nos. 1 and 2) are 
alongside the generating station and open into the Mattagami River, while 8 are nearly 
3.2 km upstream and open into Adam Creek.  Sluices 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 (Reference 
Figure 29) are remotely controlled from Northeast CC. Sluices 5, 6, 9 and 10 are locally 
controlled by the operator agents at the gate. The sluices are numbered from right to left 




only be made for the Little Long GS as the remaining 3 GS were programmed using the 
same concept but with some adaptations for their ope ating rules. 
 
5.4 MODELING LOCAL INFLOW AT KIPLING 
The local Inflow at Kipling-and the other 3 stations- are not necessarily required as at 
present as the local flow within the Mattagami basin are too low to have any sort of 
impact on the dam operations performance or safety. With that said, modeling the Local 
inflow at Kipling is just to demonstrate how additional inflows with stochastic attributes 
can be modeled 
and incorporated 













     
Figure 37: GoldSim™  Model Snapshot; Kipling. 
The 50 year Historical flow data collected for Kipling’s local inflow was fitted with a 
distribution of which the best 2 distributions were Laplace distribution and the normal 
distribution. Stochastic processes can be modeled in GoldSim™ by event generator 
elements. These Stochastic events may be random in time or may be triggered by 
circumstances. In this case the local inflow at Kipling is modeled on a time based normal 
distribution with a mean of -.383 m^3/s and a standard deviation of 13.531 m^3/s (see 
figure 33). 



































Figure 40: Statistical representation of randomness in Local Inflow 
Figure 34 shows the randomness of local inflow as afunction of time; this statistic is the 
mean of 5 realizations over a year’s interval. Figure 35 shows the probability 
distributions of those 5 realizations. 
 
5.5 SIMULATION RUN SETTINGS 
Two sets of runs were done with basically the same data. The first run was set up to use 
the 50 year historic data to populate the future 50 years forward. The second run, which 
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likelihood charts per month, was achieved by running the Simulation from January 1st to 
December 31st for 50 Monte Carlo realizations. 
 
5.6 MODEL RUN SETTINGS   
The simulation time was optimized by nesting the time steps. Goldsim’s™ advanced time 
settings enables the dynamic control of the timestep based on specified parameters in the 
model. The timestep can be set to a much smaller int rvals when the value of a parameter 
is at, above or below a certain threshold and vice ersa. As in this case, the time step was 
triggered to narrow down from 6 hours to 30 mins at inflows in exceedance of Little 
Longs 583m3/s station capacity.  
 
5.7 FLOW ROUTING SAMPLE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
With the salient aspects of the model formulated anconstructed, the next step is to 
generate results from the model and analyze whether it accurately replicates the real life 
system. This is part of the model validation process and hence outputs from the model 
was compared to data from the LMR complex. Also expert opinion has been sought in 





Figure 41: Upstream daily flow Simulation Results over 51 year period 
Figure 36 shows the plot of the upstream daily flow from the Mattagami River into Little 
Long Reservoir as a function of time (50 years). The peaks seen in the chart are the 
maximum freshet flows in a year. The maximum inflow ver the 50 year simulation 
period was 4942.0 m3/s which is consistent with the maximum inflow from the data set. 
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Figure 37 shows a heat map with the annual probabilities. Thedarker colors represent 
more probable inflow rates and lighter colors meaning less probable inflow rates. Figure 
38 also shows the mean daily statistics over a one year period for 50 replications of 
annual data; that is, from start of January to end if December (year on chart should be 
ignored). 
 
Figure 43: Mean upstream daily flow showing seasonal variations 
Figure 39 also shows statistics on the Spill into Adam Creek. Adam Creek Bypass has a 
total capacity of 4870m3/s and the current operating rule for power production and spill 
shows that Adam creek will be required to spill at around full capacity at certain times 
during the peak freshet periods. Figure 40 shows the mean Spill into Adam Creek which 
not surprisingly, follows a similar profile as that of the upstream daily flows. Its peak 
coincides with the peak from the Daily inflows since that’s the period in which it’s the 




































Figure 45: Mean Flow into Little Long Adam creek and Mattagami River System 
The practice of Spilling into the main river is generally discouraged and the two Spillway 
gates at Little Long only come into use as a contingency when the 8 spillway gates that 
open into Adam creek are insufficient in routing out peak flows to keep the reservoir pool 
elevation within the operating range. Figure 41 shows a plot of the Spill into the 
Mattagami River when the historic time series was propagated 51 years forward. In 





























































compares the mean daily spill over 51 annual replications to that of the mean Inflow for 
the same period. 
 

















































































Spill Into Mattagami River
Statistics for Spill_Into_MattagamiRiver
Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%





































5.7.1   POOL AND VOLUME CAPACITIES 
For the 51 year run, it’s important to analyze how the flow routing procedures ensure that 
reservoirs are mostly operating within the operating range. The operating range for Little 
Long reservoir is 195.10m-198.12m. As can be observed in figure 44, the performance of 
the flow routing techniques generally keeps the elevation in the dam below the imminent 
dam failure elevation but occasionally exceeds the maximum operating elevation about 
once every 2 years by just skimming at the plot of c urse this does not affect dam 
operations with regards to power performance or safety as it’s still a full meter below the 
imminent failure elevation.  
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Figure 49: Mean annual elevations at all four stations 
 
Figure 50: Probabilistic distribution statistics showing likelihood of reservoir elevations for a year run and 50 
replications 
Figure 45 also compares the different reservoirs from the four dams. As expected, Little 
Long has the most seasonal variation in volume since it serves as the main storage 
reservoir for the four dams and routes water both through the Mattagami River and Adam 
Creek. Also the three dams downstream have similar sto age capacities, as can be 
inferred from the plots. Figure 3 compares the elevations at each of the Dam sites. Figure 
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Figure 50: 50 year simulation run showing variability in Storage volume at all four GS 
 
 
 5.8 POWER PRODUCTION 
As dictated by the operating rule, the dam is filled to an elevation of 198m and the 
calculated head over the turbine intake is 198-170.22=27.28m. At maximum reservoir 
operating capacity of 198.12m, max head over turbines=27.9m.  
The 12cm difference-as noted-is to allow for the four hour time lag required to dispatch 
operator agents to the station to deal with the contingency. Hence the model is 
programmed such that Little Long Reservoir fills to 198m. If the inflow into the reservoir 
exceeds what is required for best efficiency power g neration as provided in the unit 
rating table, the excess inflow is routed out of the reservoir through the spillway gates.  
Consequently, if the inflow into the reservoir is below what is required for best efficiency 
























maintained while inflow water (equivalent volume) is routed through turbine intake 
sluices. On the other hand if the inflow into the reservoir is less than the minimum for 
best efficiency flow but the reservoir elevation is above the minimum operating 
elevation, then the reservoir elevation is gradually lowered while generating the 








constraints at, the LL dam is operated simply by following the best efficiency power 
generation values provided in the unit rating table when upstream flow is equal to or 
more than the specified discharges for best efficiency power generation. Where the 
inflow is more than the best efficiency discharges, the excess inflow is routed through the 
4 spillways automatically controlled through the SCADA systems into Adam Creek. 
Then again, if the four SCADA controlled gates that open into the bypass are insufficient 
(i.e, when reservoir elevation is greater than 198m and upstream flow exceeds the total of 
turbine flow and spilled flow) human operators are dispatched to the site to operate the 
additional 4 gates that open into the bypass with a me n lag time of four hours. If all the 
gates opening into Adam Creek bypass are still insufficient, the additional two gates that 
open into the Mattagami River are used to supplement spilled flow and keep the dam 
from overtopping. As can be seen from the plots, thi  rarely occurs and when it has, the 

































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%
15%..25% / 75%..85% 25%..35% / 65%..75% 35%..45% / 55%..65%
45%..55% 50%




modeling spillway gate reliability looks at this in more detail. Figure 48 shows a plot of 
the daily power production expectation (probability) as a function of time from start of 
January to end of December for annual 51 replications. As can be expected, the profile of 
power generation is highly correlated with that of upstream daily flow (See figure 49). 
 






















































6.   SPILLWAY ANALYSIS MODELING AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
The main function of Spilway gates at dam sites is to afely pass water from one point to 
another; usually from a reservoir, through a dam to a downstream river or reservoir  This 
is achieved by keeping the 3 main components, namely: the rate of flow, the physical 
conveyance of flow and the kinetic and potential energy of the flow under control.  
According to Baecher et al, “The components of water conduits are all natural or 
manmade structures with civil, mechanical or electrical functions and with certain 
capabilities to resist the dynamic and static loads imposed on them”. Meaning for a 
spillway to perform it’s task safely, flow must be k pt to within a range which does not 
exceed the design capacities of it’s subcomponents ( lectrical, structual, mechanical etc.). 
Thus, the reliable peformance of a Spillway system is both a function of time and the 
loads placed upon upon it. This chapter explores th dynamics of flow routing though 
Spillway gates and the inherent reliability of these gates under extreme flow and normal 
flow conditions over time. The Mattagami river case study herein will be used as the 
model example for demonstrating how flow is routed hrough Spillway gates and their 
inherent reliability. 
 
6.1 VERTICAL LIFT GATES 
 Vertical lift gates are a common type of dam gate. They are used in many different 
applications including spillways, control towers, and regulating outlets. Machinery 
typically is located on a structural feature above th gate. For most dam applications, 




hydrostatic pressure can create large transverse foc s, creating large friction forces as a 
gate is being operated. Rollers or other features almost always are needed on the 
downstream side of the gate to reduce friction betwe n the gate and guides to allow 
hoisting of the gate. This discussion of vertical lift gates is provided for because all the 
spillway gates in 
operation a the 
LMR complex are 

















Figure 53: Vertical lift gate schematic 
 
 
5.3 LOAD TYPES ON GATES 
The following load types are applicable to vertical lift gates used in dams: 
a. Hydrostatic. The hydrostatic load H shall be determined based on site-specific conditions 
that account for the differential between headwater and sill bearing at the spillway crest. 
Headwater is determined from reservoir elevation computations at each of the dams. For 
single-section gates (All four dams in the LMR use singlesection gates), flow is under the 
gate. No consideration is given to water passing over the top of the gate. H represents 
hydrostatic head differential between headwater s and the sill bearing at the spillway 
crest, and is represented in Figures 51 and Figure 52. In addition, H acts as uplift on the s
bottom of the gate when passing flows through the spillway. The net uplift shall be 
determined from combined effects of downpull forces R. 
b. Hydrodynamic loads applied to tide or coastal hurricane gates shall be based on site-
specific conditions. They shall include the effects of tidal hydraulics, water levels and 
wave heights, and necessary storm surge analysis to which the gate will be subjected. 
Distribution of wave forces is dependent on the wave height and depth of water at the 
structure. Their effects should be computed for a range of possible water levels and 
periods. The effect of hydro-dynamic loads will be looked into more details in the chapter 
on disturbances. 
c. Gravity. Loads resulting from deadweight , ice, and mud some f the gravity loads 




gates will be tackled in the chapter on diturbances. Mud loads generally include silt loads 
etc. 
       
         Figure 55: Hydrostatic Force Distribution on Gates 
f. Earthquake. Design earthquake load shall be determined based on an operational basis 
earthquake (OBE). The earthquake load E shall be based on inertial hydrodynamic effects 
of water moving with the structure.  
 
6.4 RATE OF FLOW AND CONVEYANCE 
The rate of flow in a spillway (the discharge) is usually controlled at a specific point or 
cross section at the intake, where the flow changes from sub-critical upstream to super-




critical downstream (Baecher, 2014). The flow rate is then controlled by the water level 
downstream, the inflow into the reservoir and by the dimensions of the entire length and 
height of the spillway opening. Figure 33 shows the number of Spillway gates at each of 
the dam sites and their capacities. 
The greater flexibility of operation provided by gated spillways makes it possible to 
regulate either the upstream water level or the water conduit discharge in a more narrow 
band. Thus the pool elevation in a reservoir can be op rated within optimal levels for 
power generation. The price to pay for the introduction of a movable water barrier is a 
significant reduction in spillway function reliability since several components and 
subcomponents have to come together and function on demand for the gated spillway 
System to work. The issue of functional reliability will be looked at in more details later 
on in this chapter. 
 
6.5 SPILLWAY GATE OPERATIONS: FLOW ROUTING AT LMR 
During high river flow conditions (e.g., spring runoff) when the Little Long GS reservoir 
is near its maximum limit, the spillway at Adam Creek will be operated in conjunction 
with Little Long GS to pass the full Mattagami River flow. The duration and magnitude 
of the spill down Adam Creek is dependent on the magnitude and duratin of the incoming 
flow into the Little long Reservoir . Since the Littling long Generating Stations have a a 
combined  capacity of 
583 m3/s, an upstream 
flow in excess of this will 




be spilled via Adam creek first, and in rare peak scenarios, through the Mattagami River. 
Focus will be placed on the Little Long dam for Model examples since the modeling of 
the spillway gates at the other 3 sites follow a similar modeling framework with 
modifications in their operating rules.  
 
Figure 57: Spillway gates at Little Long 
 
6.6 FAILURE 
As noted earlier, there is a price to pay for the introduction of a movable water barriers 
although it’s advantages vastly outweighs it’s disavantages. Yet, the failure of gated 
Spillways can be catastrophic and hence there is a need to identify the general causes of 
gated spillway systems failures and put into place contingencies and mitigation measures.  
A large number of spillways have failed to perform as desired when called upon to so in 
the past with the most common cuses being failure of gates to open for reasons of 
electric, mechanical or operational nature. This type of failure may occur at any time 




6.7 FAILURE MECHANISMS 
Leveson (1995) defined failure as the nonperformance or inability of the system or 
component to perform its intended function for a specified time under specified 
environmental conditions. Failure conditions are usually brought about by any one of a 
number of natural hazards or other external or internal disturbances, but eventually, 
failure always comes down to structural insufficieny, either insufficient dimensions to 
contain the flow or insufficient integrity to withstand the occurring forces or a 
combination of these (Baecher, 2014). At a high level of abstraction any occasion when a 
system does not fulfil its function constitutes a failure of the system.  
Failure at a systems level differs from failure at the component level in that failure at the 
component level may not necessarily cause failure of the entire system. In some cases, a 
system may still function even though it has a compnent failure and in fact this is a 
property of a well designed system (Baecher, 2014). The high level definition is not 
usually sufficient for the purpose of a detailed analysis of the system, but the failure 
needs to be tied to a particular component or set of components, whether physical objects, 
resources or procedures. This concept will be explored later on in this chapter with the 
aim of modeling how component and subcomponent failure affects the entire system at a 
higher level. For example, a spillway gate might not open on demand due to an electrical 
issue related to it’s generator but the other spillway gates may function and the entire 
system may be unaffected by the failure of one of the subcomponents f that particular 
spillway gate. It is up to the user to define which particular definition of failure and 





6.8  FAILURE MODE OF GATES 
a. Hydraulic capacity: Insufficient hydraulic capacity of the spillway gates is the classic 
failure mode that will be explored. It will  (may) manifest itself as a raised reservoir 
water level and the final failure may then take on the form of a dam overtopping. 
 
b. Potential capacity not available: The hydraulic capacity of spillway gates may be reduced 
by the influence of floating debris, ice or sediments restricting the free opening size or by 
gates not opening. 
c. Floating debris: Rivers will carry floating debris, especially during floods. Depending on 
the natural conditions of the catchment the debris may be in the form of uprooted large 
trees, cut timber, branches, bushes, grass, floating mires, dead animals and various 
manmade objects such as bridges, boats and houses. Floating debris can significantly 
influence the discharge capacity of spillways by sticking to structures such as gates, 
spillway piers and bridges spanning spillways, to obstruct spillway openings and prevent 
gate operation (Baecher, 2014). This phenomenon will be further explored in the chapter 
on disturbances. 
d. Ice: Ice can reduce spillway discharge capacities in different ways. At break-up of lake 
ice or river ice and the ensuing ice floes can build up and jam spillway openings, 
particularly those of limited free dimensions in the same way as trees or other types of 
floating debris.  Ice or frazil developed in super-cooled water can also adhere to gates and 
spillway piers and prevent gate opening or reduce the size of the free opening and thereby 
limit the discharge capacity. Leaky seals are a not uncommon reason for ice build-up 




Ice jams, many meters in height, can also develop where frazil adheres to the boundaries 
of rivers and channels to completely change the hydraulic capacities and rating curves. 
Fresh water only requires super-cooling of the water to fractions of a degree under 0° 
Celsius to make frazil production possible throughout a water body. Weather conditions 
promoting super-cooling and frazil growth in shallow waters involve those with very high 
heat losses from the water due to inter alia radiation, low air temperature, wind and heavy 
snowfall.  Where the effects of ice need to be considered specifically, modeling of the ice 
conditions in the reservoir and river upstream and downstream may be required. Ideally 
this should be done in coupled models taking into account the effects of the flow and 
weather on the ice processes as well as the effects of the ice on the flow.  
e. Sediments: Many rivers carry significant amounts of solids, especially those in more 
easily erodible materials. In rivers running through old and stable igneous rocks, 
sediments may on the contrary often not be present in appreciable amounts. Coarse 
sediments, carried as bed load by a river will initially settle in the upstream end of 
reservoirs, where flow velocities start to reduce and the carrying capacity of the flow 
diminishes. Finer sediments carried as suspended loa will continue further into a 
reservoir and usually tends to create bars sloping around 1%. Unless regular (annual) 
flushing is performed of the reservoir, these sedimnt bars may in time reach and start to 
clog intake areas for water conduits, such as bottom outlets, power intakes and sometime 
even spillway intakes. Sediments have a similar potential to disturb water conduit 
operation as floating debris and ice, but in addition, the discharge of coarse sediments 




6.9 RELIABILITY AND PEFORMANCE OF GATED SPILLWAYS 
Gated Spillway systems are generally designed to set f defined engineering standards, 
however with the effects of aging, exposure, preventative maintenance, and lack of 
frequent operations in combination with human error seem to make these systems more 
vulnerable than one would think (Baecher, 2014).  The on demand failures of gated 
Spillways are complex and may be caused by a gate component that can be repaired in 
minutes to hours or a component that may cause complete failure of the gate system and 
unexpected release of the reservoir containment. 
 
6.9.1 FLOW ROUTING CAPACITIES 
Although the four GSs are in close proximity, Smoky Falls GS was constructed over 30 
years earlier to serve a different purpose than Little Long GS, Harmon GS and Kipling 
GS. Smoky Falls GS is a 4-unit, baseload station operating effectively 24 h/d with a rated 
flow capacity of 188 m3/s. The other three stations (Little Long GS, Harmon GS and 
Kipling GS) each has two units and are peaking stations that operate depending on 
available inflows (Ontario Hydro 1990). The different operating patterns under the 
current situation require that Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS headpond 
water levels fluctuate daily.  
 
6.9.2 MODELING FUNCTION AND FAILURE 
During the service life of a dam, operating conditions and natural environmental factors 
may lead to some deterioration in its structural integrity, mechanical equipment, and 
foundation. A fragility model of a dam provides a tool for rational safety assessment and 




uncertainty that affect dam performance. In this paper, basic fragility concepts are 
presented, and databases required to support the fragility assessment are identified. The 
method is illustrated using a concrete monolith from the Bluestone Dam in West 
Virginia, designed in the late 1930s. 
 
Figure 58: Systems Interactions  
Traditional design practices have been sufficiently conservative that the probability of 
dam failure under a probable maximum flood 11 m (36ft) higher than the original design-
basis flood remains small. The reservoir water level on the gates is a key parameter since 
it affects the loading on the gates (stresses in gate members which determines the 
frictional resistance) and also the consequences of gate failure (due to the effect on the 
breach outflow). It is most likely that the reservoi  water surface elevation will be at the 
top of the gates when this potential failure mode is triggered, unless the gates are being 





6.10 LITTLE LONG GS SPILLWAY GATES MODELING 
As discussed earlier in the hydrolic modeling chapter, Little Long GS is operated within 
an operating range of 195.10 m-198.12 m with the main aim of the operating rules being 
to optimize power generation and route flow safely downstream. 
Each of the gates were modeled independently as they each have independent reliability 
components at both the component and subcomponent level.
As discussed in the chapter 4, Little Long forebay is filled to an elevation not exceeding 
198.00 metres.  After achieving that elevation, anyinflow greater than the amount of 
water required for two-unit operation (583 m3/s) is spilled down Adams Creek.   The 
difference of 12-centimeter of storage will allow for the four hour time lag required to 
dispatch operator agents to the station to deal with the contingency. The maximum 
forebay level of 198.00 meters is during the freshet period only. There is no requirement 
to spill through the main dam.  This practice should be avoided to improve operating 
efficiency at Smoky Falls during freshet. Sluice-gates 5, 6, 9, and 10 are controlled 
locally by the operator agents at the gates.  Two to four hours may be required to reach 
the site. 
 
6.11 COMMUNICATION AND HUMAN OPERATOR MODELING 
The safe operation of any industrial facility is hig ly dependent on the humans who 
operate and manage them, and who may be called upon to make decisions in the face of 
unexpected disruptions or other events.  The reliability of human operators in the face of 
complex technological systems is discussed in further detail in the chapter on 




reservoir, as spillway gates respond to changing reservoir conditions and demands, as 
power is generated, and as other parts of the system function—observations are 
continuouslyy being made to inform automatic controlle s and to inform decisions made 
by human operators. These observations form the basis of a communications or data flow 
from sensors to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions (SCADA) systems and 
eventually to operators (Baecher, 2014). For this capter, human operators as pertaining 
to the LMR complex will be treated as “humans in the loop” as if they are any other sub-
component of the complex technological systems. This simplistic assumption allows us to 
model human operator delays as on a probabilistic distribution. Chapter 6 delves into 
more details on Human reliability analysis. 
According to the operating rules for Little Long GS, operators are to be dispatched to 
Little Long GS when the 4 Spillway gates that open into the Mattagami River are 
insufficient in routing peak flows ou of the dam to keep the reservoir below it’s operating 
range maximum. It generally takes operators 2 to 4 hours to get to the site after they’re 
dispatched but it may take longer due to inclement weather scenarios in which case it 
might take much longer to gain access to the control s ation of the dam as roads might 
blocked etc. To capture these rare but possible scenarios outside the usual 2-4 hour time 
required to get operators on site, a truncated lognormal distribution with an upper limit of 
24 hrs, minimum limit of 2 hrs and true mean of 3 hrs as can be seen in figure 56. Figure 
57 shows a plot of the operator related related delay modelled over a year from January-




















6.13 RESERVOIR OPERATIONS 
This potential failure mode requires operation of the radial gates to initiate the failure. If 
the gates remain in the closed position, trunnion pin friction will not be mobilized and the 
gate members will not be loaded by this mechanism. Reservoir operation levels will only 
be a factor if the spillway is operated at levels below the top of the gate elevation (or 









































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%
15%..25% / 75%..85% 25%..35% / 65%..75% 35%..45% / 55%..65%
45%..55% 50%
Figure 59: Modeling Operator Delay Snapshot 




typically at or near the top of the gates on an annu l basis when the gates are likely to be 
operated or tested, this is a more hazardous situation than if the reservoir frequently does 
not reach the top of the gates on an annual basis, or the gates are typically tested when the 
reservoir is low. The likelihood of various reservoi  levels at times when the gates will be 
operated can typically be estimated from the historic reservoir exceedance curves.  
6.14 ACCOUNTING FOR PERFORMANCE UNCERTAINTY 
Typically, the reservoir elevation exceedance probabilities are taken directly from the 
historical reservoir operations data, directly, which do not account for uncertainty. 
Uncertainty in the failure probability and consequences are accounted for by entering the 
estimates as distributions (as describe above) rather than single point values. A “Monte 
Carlo” simulation is then run to display the uncertain y in the estimates, as described in 
the section on Combining and Portraying Risks. 
6.14.1 RELIABILITY  OF SYSTEMS 
A structural system may have multiple components and failure modes. A structure is 
considered safe or reliable if its capacity, C, exceeds the demand, D placed on it: 
C ≥ D or C − D ≥ 0 or ≥ 1 or  
"
# $ 1 
The reliability of a structure, ps, is the probability that the structure survives or pe forms 
safely. 
Hence probability of failure Pf, can be defined as 





A system analysis may also indicate that the structu e as a whole may be unsafe even 
though each individual component may have adequate safety.  
According to McKay (2005) there are many advantages ained by quantifying the 
interrelationship between the components and analyzi g a structure as a system. For 
example, a system analysis can reveal that some repairs are more important than others. 
A system analysis may also indicate that the structu e as a whole may be unsafe even 
though each individual component may have adequate safety; which is what we attempt 
to explore in this paper. 
 
 
Figure 62: Threat-Vulnerability-Consequence model with input parameters and output prediction 
 
6.14.2 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
The Fault Tree Analysis of system reliability for mechanical and electrical systems  has 
been used on a number of spillway gate installations globally.  The focus of the systems 
reliability analysis will be on the structural, mechanical and electrical considerations of 
spillway gate operation.  
There are two types of logic (fault) trees that canbe defined for a reliability element in 
GoldSim™: a requirements-tree (the default) or a fault-tree.  A requirements tree must 
evaluate to true in order for the element to operate, while a fault tree must evaluate to 







contributing to the risk of dam failure, the reliability estimates were used in an overall 
dam safety risk assessment as responses from the fault trees affect the entire system due 
to the feedback loops in the systems model. 
6.14.3 ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT FAILURE AND MODELING 
 The reliability or probability of survival at any point in time during the useful life period 
is computed as: 
&'	!  ()* 
Equation 3: Reliability of component 
where t is the time period and λ is the statistical failure rate. 
5.14.4 MODELING SIMPLE FAILURE RATES IN GOLDSIM™ 
The simple failure rate is the default failure mode for both the Function and the Action 
element. It is equivalent to the Exponential/Poisson failure mode, and uses Total time as 
its control variable. This mode cannot be repaired automatically; it can only be repaired 
using the Replace trigger. The probability distribution function of the underlying 
Exponential/Poisson distribution has the following shape and equation: 
 
Figure 63: Exponential Poisson distribution 
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where µ is the mean control variable value at failure 
The reliability function of the underlying Exponential/Poisson distribution has the 
following shape and equation: 
 
Figure 64: Shape of Exponential/Poisson Distribution 
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Equation 5: Reliability function of an exponential/Poisson distribution 
The simple failure rate uses Total time as its control variable, and places the time to the 
next failure in the event queue, which will interrupt the simulation at 
the exact time of failure. Because the Exponential distribution is memoryless, the simple 
failure rate parameter is fully dynamic, and control variable values at failure are updated 
whenever the Failure Rate changes.  
 
6.14.5 CUMULATIVE FAILURE MODE 
The Cumulative failure mode allows you to specify a table of the value of the control 
variable and the corresponding probability of surviving to that value. The Cumulative 
failure mode is actually specified as a reliability function, rather than as a probability 
density function (you specify the control variable value and the probability of survival). 




component failure at LMR complex by using modified fragility curves from another dam 
project the this paper had some time constraints which did not make it possible to wait for 
the actual LMR comple fragility curves for the gates. 
6.14.6 THE FRAGILITY CURVE 
In safety or risk assessment of dams, limit states or probability of failure serve as 
yardsticks of system performance. The fragility curve is used to predict the probably of 
dam failure, given the hydraulic hazard (Chase, 2012). The fragility curve is defined by 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the system response curve. 
For example of a dam in which the overtopping limit state, i.e., FSovertopped≤ 1.0, is the 
limit state resulting in failure of the dam.  
The probability of failure, Pfailure, is given by the expression: 
P0123456  7 &8965*8::6; < 1.0 ? & 
@ABBC
D:883!&&  D:883! 
Equation 6: Probability of failure for fragility curves 
In which Pool is a vector of random variables describing the intensity of demand (e.g. 
pool elevation, etc.) and other factors; P(Pool = D:883) is the hazard, considering channel 
inflows and storm runoff from the watershed behind the dam, and is expressed in terms of 
annual probability; and P(8965*8::6;≤ 1.0 | Pool = D:883 ) is the conditional 
probability of structural failure, given that Pool = D:883, Expressing the limit state 
probability as in Equation 5 allows the overall risk to be deconstructed into its significant 
contributors (Chase, 2012).  
The fragility curve is defined by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the system 
response curve. The CDF for both mechanical and structural failure can be observed in 
figure 61 and figure 63 with the failure mode contrl variable (Height of water elevation 
 
 
on Gates) on the X axis and the Cumulative 
62 and 64 also show the hazard rating curves, that is; the probability of failure at a 
specified level of the Failure mode control variable (FMCV).
Mechanical fragility 
  
Figure 65: Cumulative Distribution curve for Mechanical Equipment 
 
Figure 66: Fragility Curve for Mechanical Gate 
 












Figure 68: Fragility Curve for Structural Gate Failure
 
6.14.7 ELECTRICAL FAILURE
The Failure Rate (also known as the hazard rate) repres nts the mean failure
dimensions of inverse time. Failure is assumed to be a Poisson process (which implies 



















modeled in this way are computed with respect to the time since the simulation started an 
hence the time is the failure mode control valuable.  
Electrical Reliability, specified as the electrical availability On Demand of the System 
(including operator push button error and external and internal power failures) is 
estimated at 0.017 faliures per day.  
 
6.15 REPAIR TIME DISTRIBUTIONS USED FOR THE LMR 
Gamma Distribution 
For repairs (down time), the Gamma distribution is specified using a mean delay time 
until repair (µ) and a standard deviation (σ). The Gamma distribution has the following 
shape and equation: 






Equation 7: Failure rate of a gamma distribution 
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Mean Down Time 10 hrs 6 months 1 week 
Standard 
Deviation 8 hrs 2 months 1 week 
Distribution Gamma Gamma Gamma 
Table 9: Component Down Times 
 
6.16 METHOD OF MODELING : FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
A fault tree is a graphical method of describing the combinations of events leading to a 
defined system failure. In fault tree terminology, the system failure mode is known as the 
top event. The fault tree involves essentially three logical possibilities and hence two 
main symbols. These involve gates such that the inputs below gates represent failures. 
Outputs (at the top) of gates represent a propagation of failure depending on the nature of 
the gate. The three types are: the OR gate, whereby any input causes the output to occur; 
the AND gate, whereby all inputs need to occur for the output to occur; the voted gate, 
similar to the AND gate, whereby two or more inputs are needed for the output to occur. 
The structural, mechanical and electrical reliability were modeled with and gates since 
failure in each will cause the entire Sillway to be unavailable.  
 
6.17 BACKGROUND TO GOLDSIM™ AND THE RELIABILITY MODULE 
The reliability module is an add-on to the standard GoldSim™ simulation framework, 
consisting of two main element types: the Function element and the Action element. The 




of time or use (e.g., a battery or an environmental control system), while Action elements 
are used to model components that perform their dutes only when triggered by a specific 
condition or conditions (e.g., a relay, or an actuator). The primary output of a reliability 
element is its operating state at any given time during the simulation: whether it is 
operating or not. Both reliability element types contain features to accurately represent 
components of a reliability system in a dynamic Monte-Carlo simulation. These include: 
Requirements/Fault Trees, On/Off Switches, Failur modes, Repair Logic and 
containment. 
 
6.17.1 WHY PREDICT RAMS? 
Reliability prediction (i.e. modeling) is the process of calculating the anticipated system 
RAMS from assumed component failure rates. It provides a quantitative measure of how 
close a proposed design comes to meeting the design objectives and allows comparisons 
to be made between different design proposals. It has already been emphasized that 
reliability prediction is an imprecise calculation, but it is nevertheless a valuable exercise 
for the following reasons: 
• It provides an early indication of a system’s potential to meet the design reliability 
requirements. 
• It enables an assessment of life-cycle costs to be carried out. 
• It enables one to establish which components, or areas, in a design contribute to the 
major portion of the unreliability. 
• It enables trade-offs to be made as, for example, between reliability, maintainability and 




• Its use is increasingly called for in invitations to tender, contracts and in safety-integrity 
standards. 
 
Figure 70: GoldSim™  Component Status Representation 
 
6.18 MODELING LITTLE LONG SPILLWAY RELIABILITY 
Each of the Spillway gates at Little Long are modele  and operated independently. As 
dictated by the operating rules, the 4 SCADA controlled gates that open into the creek are 
first operated on demand. If these four gates are insufficient in routing flows, then human 
operators are dispatched to the site with a time lag of on the average 2-4 hours during 




good weather conditions and assuming accesibility to the control center. The human 
operators initiate the opening of the additional four gates that open into the Adam creek 
bypass to aid in routing out the eak flows from thereservoir and keep it within the 
operating range. In addition to this contingency, 2 extra spillway gatesthat open into the 
Mattagami river provide additional spil capacity just incase the 8 gates that open into the 
Adam Creek bypass are unsufficient. Figure 67 shows The graphical model of the gate 
set up. 
Gates N1 and N2 are the emergency gates that open into the Mattagami River (containers 
N1_SCADA_Gate1 and N1_SCADA_Gate2). Gate N3, N4, N7 and N8 are the primary 
SCANDA control Spillway gates and open into the Bypass. Gates N5, N6, N9 and N10 
also open into the Bypass and are the secondary gates operated by humans. 
Figure 68 shows an incorporation of an event tree in SCADA Gate 1’s modeling 
interface. There’s and gate named AND which requires the spillway gates to not have 
failed under 3 scenarios, namely: Gate availability (Electrical reliability), Structural 
fragility and Mechanical fragility. Failure in any of these 3 scenarios will cause the entire 
system to fail and be unavailable until it has repaired. The fragility and failure rate date 
are all incorporated into these sub models.  Figure 68 shows part of the model 
subcomponent interface for modeling the reliability components. Figure 69 shows the 
And Gate and how it is programmed to link to other conditions of which all must work 














Imminent Dam Failure during reservoir inflow floods (Overtopping Failure) is assumed 
to occur when water reache
failure elevation; thus when the elevation exceeds the imminent dam failure elevation.
Figure 73: GoldSim™ And Properties Dialog 
 
 AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
s a stage specified the operating documents as imminent dam 







Figure 68 shows a snapshot of the one of the Spillway gates sub model interface. A high-
level model is useful in understanding some of the behavior patterns responsible for the 
unavailability of a spill way gate on demand; which nduces a high risk of system failure. 
A simulation for a year from start of a calendar year to end of calendar year was run by 
sampling a calendar years’ worth of inflow data from the historic time series and routing 
it through the system. Figure 71 shows a plot of SCADA controlled Spills within a single 
calendar year as a function of time. A graph of theupstream daily flow is also 
superimposed on the plot to enable viewing the correlation between the upstream daily 
flow and the SCADA controlled Spillway discharges (withdrawals). As expected, the two 
are heavily correlated with the peak flows coinciding with the peak Spillway discharges 
by the SCADA controlled gates. Each Spillway gate has a maximum capacity of 608.8 
cubic meters; meaning the combined capacity of the four spillway gates is about 2400 
cubic meters. During peak inflows we can see that te combined effect of the four gates 




Where the combined effect of the four SCADA controlled Spillway gates are rendered 
insufficient due to high inflows, operators are dispatched to the site to operate the 
additional four manually operated gates to add additional spill capacity to the gates and 
prevent the dam from being overtopped. Figure 72 show  a plot of the operator controlled 
Spill as a function of time with a graph of the upstream daily flows superimposed on the 
plot. These gates double the Spill capacity of the Little Long GS. 
 





































































































When the four Human Operated gates are also rendered insufficient in routing the excess 
inflows, there are two additional SCADA controlled gates that open into the Mattagami 
River that are instructed to be used in these rare scenarios where the 8 that open into the 
creek are insufficient. Figure 73 shows a plot of the total spill into Adam Creek bypass as 
a function of time. As can be observed from the plot, there was no need to spill through 
the Mattagami River since the Spillway gates that open into the bypass where sufficient 
in routing out the peaking flows. Figure 75 shows a plot of the total spill into Adam creek 
bypass as a function of time. 
 
Figure 77: Plot of Spill into Adam Creek 
 
Figure 78: Plot of Total stream vs Upstream Daily Flow Vs time 
0
1





































































Figure 79: Plot of Upstream Daily Flow Vs Spill Into Adam Creek 
To demonstrate the effect of the gate opening and closing on discharge, a plot of the 
spillway discharge rate (in red) and the gate opening height (green) was plotted; see 
figure 76. The height of the gate opening is generally at a maximum of 9.2m during the 
peak flow periods to enable maximum routing water from the reservoir. The gate opens at 
an average of 0.68m/min and closes at the same rate. Its opening is triggered by the 
operating rule requirements which enables the SCADA systems to open the gate when 
these requirements are met and vice versa. 
 


























































































Figure 77 shows the correlation between high inflows and it’s correlation with the 
upstream daily flow. The sill of each Spillway gate is at elevation 188.98m which means 
that within the operating range, there is always some level of water on the gates. This 
affects the reliability of the gates since the water on the gates induces both hydrostatic 
and hydrodynamic forces on the gates. Level of water on the gates are the failure mode 
control variable for both the Mechanical and structural failures; meaning the higher the 
water elevation on the gates, the higher the effect of the aforementioned forces and 
consequently the higher the probability of failure. 
 
Figure 81:  Plot of Water Elevation on Spillway Gates vs Upstream Daily flow Vs Time 
 
The subsequent plots show the means and annual probabilities for all 51 years of historic 
time series. Figure 78 shows a plot of the mean upstream daily  flows, gate opening range 


























































expected, the peak inflows correlates with the maxium gate opening ranges and also 
with the highest routing capacities. 
 
Figure 82: Mean Statistics for Upstream flow vs Gate Opening vs Discharge  
Figure 79 also demonstrates the annual probabilities of gate opening operations. This is 
important because should a number of gates fail during the period of April to July and are 
not able to get fixed quickly, the chances of the dam being overtopped greatly increases. 
It is imperative that during this period when the requirements on the gates are high, 
contingencies must be put in place to backup any gate failures. 
 




























































































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%





Figure 81 is a plot of the mean operator Spill over th  51 years of historic data from start 
of January to end of December. It can be inferred fom this plot that Operators must be on 
standby during the start of freshet to travel to the site and operate the additional gates if 
need be. It’s important or management to ensure that from the start of April to August 
ending, all roads to the control center are cleared of any snow etc. and be accessible to 
human operators on demand to enable swift response t  ignals to operate the additional 
four gates during high inflow periods. Figure 82 also shows that based on historical data, 
the requirement for operators to be dispatched to the site through the year is below the 
50th percentile with the annual peak flows having annual probability of about .45 to 
require human operators.  
 
































Figure 85: Probability statistics for Operator controlled spill 
Figure 83 shows a plot of the Probability of Spill into the main Dam. This is important in 
order to prepare for the consequences of Spilling into the main dam. Over the years, the 
probability of Spill into the main dam has been rare with a mean probability (50th 
percentile) of zero cubic meters year on year. All though this indicates that Spill into the 
Mattagami is rare, contingencies must be put in place to ensure that when it occurs, its 
consequences are mitigated. 
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Figure 84 shows the average of operator controlled spill and total spill from start of year 
to end of year for 51 replications. The difference between these plots-although they both 
follow the same profile- is the operator controlled spill. This plot demonstrates the 
importance of human operators in safely routing outexcess inflows from the lower 
Mattagami reservoir. Hence hindrance to their operations or errors by them could be 
catastrophic in the events of high inflows. 
  
Figure 87: Operator Controlled Spill Vs Total Spill mean statistics 
Figure 85 shows the annual probabilities for Spillway overflows and from the plot we can 
infer that until the start of April, there is generally no Spillway flow. The month of May 
seems to have the highest demand for Spillway activities with probability of Spillway 


















































Figure 88: Probability Statistics on SCADA Controlled Spillway Overflows 
 
 
6.20 GATE RELIABILITIES 
As discussed in earlier the structural and mechanical reliabilities of the Spillway gates are 
dependent of the level of water on the gates while th  electrical gate failures are 
randomly distributed in time with an occurrence rate of 0.017 failures per day. The result 
of this is that unavailability due to electrical gate failures are far more common and occur 
a number of times per year with structural failures b ing the rarest. Figure 86 shows the 
gate failures for realization 46 (Spillway gate 4) of the simulation run. It can be observed 
that there were several electrical failures through the year with one Structural failure. The 
structural failure as discussed earlier has a gamma distribution with a delay time of 6 
months and a standard deviation of 2 months for its mean delay time until repaired 
(MTTR). The effect of this is that structural failures take much longer to repair while 
electrical gate unavailability-with a gamma distribution (mean=10hrs, Standard 









































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95%





the survival mode and the value of 2 represents failure due to the fact that internal 
requirements are not met. 
 
Figure 89: Plot of component Reliabilities vs upstream daily flow vs time 
The effect of failure on the performance of the entir  system can be observed from Figure 
86. Spillway gate 4 was inoperable due to its failed state under structural failure and was 
down for repair sometime before the peak flow for the year (April ending). Between 
Aprils ending to mid-October Spillway gate 4 was down for repair. During this time the 
SCADA controlled Spillway gates were required to route the excess inflows out of the 
reservoir. Bearing in mind the each gate has a capacity of about 608 cubic meters, it can 
be observed from figure 87 that with Spillway gate 4’s failure, the SCADA gate system 
was routing about 1800 cubic meters of water out of the reservoir instead of the total 



















































Figure 90: Plot of SCADA Controlled spill vs upstream daily flow vs time 
 
Figures 88 and 89 also shows another comparison with mechanical failure coinciding 
with the demand for spillway flow. From the plots, it can be observed that around the 
start of freshet, there was a mechanical failure at SCADA gate 4. This failure lasted for 
about seven days in the month of May. It coincided with the start of freshet, meaning the 
spillway gates were on demand. The effect of this mechanical failure is the loss of 
capacity of the SCADA controlled Spillway system. As can be observed from figure 89 
the rest of the spillway gates started operating just as the freshet started to peak with a 
combined discharge of about 1800 cubic meters instead of the total capacity of about 
2400 cubic meters. This occurs until SCADA gate 4 is fixed and adds an additional 600 






























Figure 91: Plot of SCADA (gate 4) Controlled spill vs upstream daily flow vs time 
 
Figure 92: Plot of SCADA Controlled spill vs upstream daily flow vs time 
Figure 90 also sows the probabilities of mechanical failure as a function of time for 1 
































































































is usually higher around the peak of freshet when t elevation of water on the gates are 
the highest. Figure 91 displays the mean of mechanial failure, Spillway Discharge 
(SCADA_Gate_4) and upstream daily flow for a calendar year over 51 replications. As 






































































Min..1% / 99%..Max 1%..5% / 95%..99% 5%..15% / 85%..95% 15%..25% / 75%..85%

































































Sometimes in the course of the operation of a dam system an extraordinary event occurs, 
such as an earthquake, an earth or rock slide into the reservoir or conveyance works, a 
major fire in the drainage area, or the like, at a time which cannot be anticipated, but that 
may affect dam operations or even dam safety (Baecher, 2014). Disturbances, can in 
principle include a broad variety of phenomena, both of natural origin such as lightning 
strikes affecting power supplies or instrumentation, or of anthropogenic origin such as the 
grid being unable to accept power and thus the powerhouse waterway having diminished 
discharge capacity, or operational incidents or accidents such as powerhouse fires. The 
exact definition is a matter of modeling convenience; severe floods or droughts may for 
instance be considered as disturbances or alternatively just as aspects of the stochastically 
modelled catchment hydrology.  
The consequences of disturbances to dam systems may be sudden impostion of loads, 
blockage, access problems, increased lead times or sudden loss of component or system 
functionality.  Consequences usually have (much) longer duration then the disturbances. 
Consequences of disturbances may be both external (indirect) and internal (direct). An 
example of the former would be changes in the run-off characteristics of a catchment 
appearing as the result of major forest clear cutting or forest fires, while an example of 
the latter may be the loss of the generation and discharge capability due to a lightning 
strike or fire in a critical transformer or cable. For the LMR case study, the approach is to 
study external disturbances as a standalone since som ort of internal disturbances have 




and power outages (grid availability on demand). The external disturbances that have 
been considered are discussed in the next section. 
 
6.20.1 EXTERNAL DISTURBANCES 
When a disturbance occurs, for example an earthquake or a landslide into the reservoir, it 
may cause damages to parts of the flow-control system, or it may trigger others 
disturbances or consequences that in turn cause damage to the dam system. It may 
simultaneously damage more than one component of the system, as for example, seismic 
ground shaking might damage mechanical equipment in one or more spillway gates while 
at the same time damaging the concrete conveyance carrying outflow from the gates. The 
combinations of damages can exaggerate consequences by limiting redundancies in the 
way the flow-control system operates. 
An important factor in analysing disturbances is their causal interactions. For example, 
both earthquakes and reservoir slides could be individually modelled as disturbances 
occuring randomly in time with some frequency and severity. However, a reservoir slide 
might also be caused by an earthquake, and thus not be “random” at all, except in the 
sense that it is triggered by another natural hazard which is considered random.  
The inter-arrival time between occurrences of the same or different types may itself be-
come a concern. For example, in traditional dam safety evaluations the joint occurrence 
of an earthquake and an extreme hydrological event is ignored, because the two events 
are logically independent and each of low probability, so their joint probability of 
occurrence within a small period of time is vanishingly small. In practice, on the other 




cannot be repaired within an impending flood season, a subsequent large but not extreme 
hydrological event may be uncontrollable due to the pre-existing spillway damage. 
There are lots of external disturbances that can possible affect dam operations but two 
main disturbances will be analysed and modelled for the LMR system case; namely 
Debris and Ice. Consideration of other disturbances including the two aforementioned are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
6.20.2 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS LIKELY EFFECTS ON THE LMR 
Table 3 identifies the potential conditions in the environment that may affect the LMR 
and its principal component(s) as adapted from the OPG proposal for the power 
expansion project for LMR. Potential conditions arise from the physical environment 
(i.e., natural hazards).  The physical environment compasses natural physical 
phenomena on land, in bodies of water and in the atmosphere. The conditions included in 
Table 7.2-1 are based on experience and potential conditions that have or could occur in 
the LMR Complex. Each natural hazard and potential environmental condition, is 










Condition Principal Affected Component(s) of the Project 
Physical Environment   
Flooding Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 
  Integrity and function of dams. 
Ice  Integrity and function of dams and water intake systems. 
Forest Fire  Integrity and function of GS and associated facilities. 
Severe Weather  Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 
Seismic Events 
 Integrity and function of dams, spillways and 
powerhouses. 
Climate Change Integrity and function of external structures and systems. 
  Integrity and function of operating regime. 
Table 6: potential environmental conditions LMR complex 
 
Flooding 
Flooding of the Mattagami River can occur in the spring during freshet or following an 
extreme precipitation event. Flooding can potentially ffect the integrity of the reservoir, 
dam and spillway structures. All of the reservoirs in the LMR Complex have an absolute 
maximum and maximum operating level, the difference between the two being the flood 
allowance. All of Little Long GS, Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS have the 
capacity to spill water in the event that flows exced the capacity of the generating 
stations. In addition, water may be diverted through the Adam Creek Diversion. Water 





The effect of flooding and the probability of flooding causing dam failure is depending 




The Mattagami River develops ice in the reservoirs beginning in November/December 
with break-up typically occurring sometime in April. During the break-up of ice, jams 
may form and have been reported downstream of Kipling GS. Even though the ice jam 
occurs downstream of the stations, it may affect the tailwater levels at Kipling GS. The 
formation of ice on the trash racks and gates is considered a routine maintenance issue 
that is dealt with through bi-weekly inspections conducted by the OPG traveling operator 
and maintenance crews. It is expected that continued maintenance will prevent ice issues 
associated with station operation. 
 
Forest Fires 
The LMR Complex is surrounded by forest that may be impacted by fire. On a continual 
basis, Natural Resources Canada evaluates a number of factors that estimate the potential 
ease of a fire starting and spreading, how potentially difficult a fire would be to control as 
well as the potential impacts of the fire to rate forest fire danger in an area (NRCAN 
2007). The LMR complex has a moderate rating fire rating indicating that potential fires 
are expected to be gentle surface fires that would be easily contained by ground crews 





The Regional Study Area is located within the Northeastern Ontario seismic zone, which 
is known to have a very low level of seismic activity (Earthquakes Canada, 2008a); 
meaning that the probability of experiencing strong earthquake shaking is low. The 
design of the each of Little Long GS, Smoky Falls GS, Harmon GS and Kipling GS 
included the design of the dam, powerhouses and spillway structures using MNR 
standards and in recognition of the Ontario Building Code. These structures were 
designed to withstand the effects of a design basis seismic event. No further measures are 
required to supplement the existing design and mitigat on features in place to resist 
seismic events. The potential for seismic events requi s no further consideration as no 
effect on the LMR complex is likely given the design considerations (Ontario Power 
Generation Inc., 2009). 
 
6.20.3 MODELING THE INHERENT DISTURBANCES 
Disturbances are generally modelled as a probability of occurrence of the hazard, an 
identification of the assets that could be damaged, the vulnerability of those assets (i.e., 
the conditional probability of damage given the hazard occurs), and an assessment of the 





Figure 95: Common modeling protocol for natural hazard risk analyses showing annual 
exceedance probabilities (AEP) of hazard and consequences. Adapted from Baecher et. 
al. 
Disturbances in this section will be modelled in a similar theoretic framework as the 
mechanical and electrical fragilities in the previous chapter. Meaning the Hazard will 
have a control variable that will determine its probability of occurrence based on the 
magnitude of that control variable (see figure 93). Disturbances of this sort are also 
characterized by a time at which they initiate, a severity, and a duration. The duration 
may be that of the disturbance itself, but for the sake of modeling simplicity, the duration 
will be the mean time to repair (MTTR) , e.g., the repair of damages due to an 
earthquake. Should a second disturbance occur before the damages are repaired, .g., a 
high reservoir inflow, the subsequent consequences of that second disturbance may be 
exacerbated. 
6.20.4 ICING EFFECT ON FLOW CONTROL 
Ice interferes with dam and spillway operations in a variety of ways from changing flood-













interfering with mechanical equipment by accumulating on gates and other features 
(Baecher, 2014). Dam gates and other dam structural become inherently vulnerable to 
under a variety of ice influencing scenarios. For instance, ice may interfere with Spillway 
operations by to creating ice sheet loads on dam faces nd other structures, to interfering 
with mechanical equipment by accumulating on gates nd other features. Dam gates and 
other moving equipment are especially vulnerable to icing which may block movement or 
weight down lifting equipment such as hoisting chains or gate arms, or increase hydraulic 
head losses at the spillway. Ice flows passing over r through discharge structures may 
block water passage, increase riverbank erosion, or foster ice jams downstream (Baecher, 
2014). 
 
6.20.5 MODELING ICE STORMS DISTURBANCE 
Ice storms can damage structures because of the weight of accumulated ice. Ice storms 
are known to occur in Eastern Ontario and Quebec. On average, Ottawa and Montreal 
receive freezing precipitation 12 to 17 days a year. However, this type of precipitation 
generally lasts only a few hours. Though it did notoccur near the LMR Complex, in 
January 1998, a severe ice storm occurred in Eastern Ontario and Quebec; over 90 
millimeters of freezing drizzle fell during the 5-day storm. This magnitude has an annual 
probability of occurrence of about 1 in 100 (Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2009).  
Due to the unavailability of Ice loading data for the LMR complex at the time this section 
of the thesis was being put together, a fragility curve for another dam site will be used to 
demonstrate how Ice storm disturbances can be incorporated into the model. The 




process since the only information we have on Ice storm occurrence is that of a severe Ice 
storm of 90mm thickness which has a probability of 1 in a hundred years of occurring. 
Figure 94 shows the sub model for the Ice storm disturbance.  
 
Figure 96: Modeling Ice Storm Event snapshot 
The time of initiation of the event is simulated as  Poisson process, such that the 
expected number of occurrences over some time period T is equal to the product of the 
Rate (.01/year) and time T.The duration is modelled as a gamma distribution for 
structural member failure and an exponential distribu ion for structural binding failure 
(table 4).  
Ice Storm Failure Type Repair Duration Type Mean Down Time 
Standard 
Deviation 
Structural Member Failure Gamma Distribution 6 months 2 months 
Structural binding failure Exponential Distribution 1 day - 
Table 2: Down times and repair times of component failures 
Figure 95 shows the fragility curves for both Strucural member failure and Structural 
binding failure. The fragility curve shows intensity on the x-axis and probability of 
failure on the y-axis. As discussed earlier, the int nsity is not incorporated I the model is 
a discrete variable. That is either 0 or 90mm of ice on the gates. Since the data for the 
amount of ice accumulation at each of the sites is unavailable, modeling the intensity of 





Figure 97: Fragility curves for Ice Loads on Spillway gate 
Figure 96 also shows how the Ice Storm Failure mode is incorporated into the event tree 
analysis for one of the Spillway gates. 
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Figures 97 and 98 show the effect of Failure due to ice storms coinciding with the 
demand for spillway flow. From the plots, it can be observed that around mid-June, there 
was a Structural binding failure at SCADA gate 4 which caused SCADA gate 4 to be 
down for repair about 2 weeks. It coincided with the ending of freshet, meaning the 
spillway gates were on demand.  
 
Figure 99: Plot of SCADA gate 4 spill vs upstream daily flow vs time vs subcomponent reliabilities 
 
The effect of this Structural binding failure is the loss of capacity of the SCADA 
controlled Spillway system. As can be seen from figure 98 the routing capacity four 
SCADA controlled gates reduced once the structural binding failure was in effect. By the 































































Figure 100: Plot of SCADA Controlled spill vs upstream daily flow vs time 
 
6.20.6 MODELING FLOATING ICE                                                                                                                                                
The ice thickness is a fundamental parameter for practically all ice problems. At the 
simplest level, one can use empirical analyses based on the Freezing Degree Days 
(FDDS). This can be refined in various ways, especially f ice thickness data are available 
for calibration. The ice thickness is a fundamental p rameter for practically all ice 
problems. Usually, the engineer is confronted with the problem of predicting the ice 
thickness, and often its return period as well, with little information. The LMR complex 
case study also has the same caveat with no historic data on floating ice available.  
 
6.20.7 SIMPLIFIED THERMAL ANALYSES  
The ice thickness, h, produced by static ice formation is most commonly predicted based 
on the accumulated Freezing Degree Days (FDDs), as given below. This equation 































































the thermal growth rate, and by making various simplifying assumptions (e.g., USACE, 
2002). 
  M N √ 
Equation 8: Stefan Equation (Thickness ice) 
Where M is an empirical coefficient that varies from site to site depending on local 
conditions such as the snow cover, winds, and solar radiation. 
Typical values of α 
Ice Cover Condition 
α (Using degree 
Celsius) 
Windy Lake w/no 
snow 2.7 
Average Lake with 
Snow 1.7-2.4 
Average river with 
snow 1.4-1.7 
Sheltered small river 0.7-1.4 







































































7.0   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 SUMMARY 
This thesis advances on the developments made in the QRA field for engineering 
reliability risk analyses. The lower Mattagami River Project was used as a case study to 
demonstrate how far the development and application of systems reliability models has 
come. The analysis approach is an outgrowth of a four-year effort by a joint-industry 
consortium of hydropower operators to improve dam sfety. In this thesis, the Systems 
Reliability modeling concept is augmented with a Monte Carlo based simulation 
framework to analyze the LMR case study and generate vital analytical outputs used to 
analyze time-dependent risks, assist engineers and managers in safety/performance 
related decision-making, create and test risk mitigation actions and policies, and monitor 
the system for states of increasing risk. The practic lity and usefulness of the Systems-
based Reliability model creation and analysis methodology was demonstrated using 
OPG’s Lower Mattagami Basin cascade of four dams.  The problem facing the project 
was to conceptualize a systems engineering model for the operation of the dams, 
spillways, and other components; then to employ the model through stochastic simulation 
to investigate protocols for the safe operation of the spillway and flow control system. 
Details of the modeling, analysis, and results for safe operation of the cascade are 







7.2   CONCLUSION 
The methodology and techniques presented in this the is provide the foundation for 
Simulation based Systems approach to dynamic Risk/Reliability model building and 
analysis. This approach falls under the Quantitative r sk assessment (QRA) methodology 
and provides both a logical framework and a systemaic procedure for organizing and 
applying scientific and engineering knowledge to improve decision making in engineered 
systems. Systems engineering and systems thinking represents a new dimension in risk 
analysis for dam safety and has built on the advancements made using contemporary 
methodologies such as event trees and fault tree analysis. The systems framework further 
enhances the QRA field by providing a concept with more powerful tools and techniques 
to holistically model and analyze time-dependent risks in complex systems. The 
contemporary methods clamp different aspects of damperformance into separate failure 
modes, and treat these failure modes separately(Baecher, 2014). The history of dam 
safety suggests that accidents and failures occur in more complex ways, mostly due to 
systems and human interactions, and need to be addressed in that way. The systems 
approach addresses these flaws from first generation/contemporary approach. It does so 
by approaching dams as engineered systems, and dam operations as an integral part of 
safety (Baecher, 2014) . Modeling these systems quantitatively is a more complex 
challenge than first generation analysis had been, and the task of verification and 
validation of the tools to support the systems approach is presented in this thesis. The 
thesis demonstrates how these new tools-via a readily vailable commercial software-can 




The concept of model integration is essential to all systems modeling. As demonstrated in 
this paper, accidents and failures occur not just because hazard loads are too high and 
dam components are fragile, but through the interacions of physical systems, sensor and 
SCADA systems, operating policies, human factors, and other aspects of dams. Fusing 
models of different subsystems using the contemporary approach is difficult and 
mathematically complex. Models of physical systems differ fundamentally from models 
of sensor and SCADA system or from models of human operator actions or operational 
rules(Baecher, 2014). The systems being modelled ar complex and exhibit non-linear 
behavior, from interacting components, often involving sub-systems that are themselves 
complex. Data mining the outputs of the simulation ru s enables us to also identify and 
examine the build-up of conditions leading to accidents or failures, the time it takes for 
some failure modes to progress from initiation to completion, the structure and nature of 
dependency among failure modes and the nature of interactions among failure 
mechanisms. 
In conclusion modeling engineered systems via stochastic simulation using a systems 
approach is very promising. In that, it affords us the platform to incorporate into the 
model feedback of operating procedures and human reliability in systems function and 
the ability to fuse models across different technological and human systems. Operational 
procedures and human decision intervention strongly affect system operations, accidents, 
and failures. These have not usually been accounted for in dam safety risk analysis and 
the proposed systems simulation approach in this the is does a good job of accounting for 
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